Essays on political economy and development by Xiao, Kezhou
The London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE)
Essays on Political Economy and Development
Kezhou Xiao
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics at the
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, 2021.
This page was intentionally left blank.
3
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the Ph.D.
degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) is
solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the
work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by
me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests solely with the author. Quotation from
it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may
not be reproduced without the author’s prior and explicit written consent.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my knowledge,
infringe the rights of any third party.
I declare that this contains three completed independent research papers
over the course of my Ph.D. career at LSE. Online appendix supporting these
papers are included in the appendix chapter of this thesis.
4
Acknowledgement
First, I’d like to express deep appreciation for Philippe Aghion for his
kind support and supervision. I’d feel thankful to Tim Besley, who has been
strict on upholding academic standards with plenty of his comments. In
retrospect, I ought to mark the visit with my parents to Anthony Giddens
in the English Parliament after the Msc. degree at LSE a distinctive event
for my intellectual development.
Second, I’d like to say thank you to all the participants at the Growth
and Development Seminar at LSE, particularly to Gerard Padro i Miquel,
Greg Fischer and Maitreesh Ghatak. I deeply appreciate those small nudges
and encouragements from Torsten Persson, Ronny Razin, Gilat Levy, Silvana
Tenreyro, Ricardo Reis, Thomas Sampson, Ethan Ilzetzki, Francesco Nava,
Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, Johannes Spinnewijn, Erik Eyster, Balazs
Szentes, Saul Estrin, Jon Danielsson, and Kent Deng. Administratively,
I express my deep gratitude to Mark Wilbor, Judith Shapiro, and Mohan
Bijapur.
Third, I ought to pay specific gratitude to Ehtisham Ahmad, who has
opened the world of economic policy to me. My joint work with him started
with my Master’s career (around 2013) and continued at the moment of
writing this thesis on another policy project. As of 2018, we have co-edited
(with Meili Niu) one policy book (Foreword by Nick Stern), a few papers, and
hosted one conference. This friendly mentorship cannot be forged without
the introduction from Athar Hussain and Ruth Kattumuri, who offered me
an internship experience at LSE Asia Research Centre when I was only a
Master student.
Fourth, I owe special intellectual ties to a few names in the United States
5
of America. At the University of Virginia, my friendship with Brantly Wom-
ack made my intellectual life at Charlottesville a unique experience. John
McLaren and Leora Friedberg gave me many ideas on Ph.D. programs in
Economics. During my transition period at Georgetown University, I had
some helpful discussions with Martin Ravallion and Luca Anderlini.
Fifth, during my field trip year at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou
China, I have greatly benefited from the socio-scientific circles. Not only have
I finished my billionaire paper much earlier than I thought, but the fact that
I have been able to present at numerous places throughout the country: Hu-
nan Business School (Nov. 2018, Changsha), Hainan University (Dec. 2018,
Haikou), Fudan University (Feb. 2019, Shanghai), Peking University (March.
2019, Beijing), Xi’an Jiaotong University (April. 2019, Xi’an), AMES 2019
at Xiamen University (June, 2019, Xiamen), Industrial Policy Workshop at
Sun Yat-sen University (July, 2019, Guangzhou), and Brownbag Seminar at
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) (Oct. 2019, Hong Kong). These
ventures will not be possible without the arrangements of fellow scholars: LU
Peng (CASS), LAN Xiaohuan (Fudan University), XI Tianyang (Peking Uni-
versity), DAI Xiaoyong (Xi’an Jiaotong University), LIANG Pinghan (Sun
Yat-sen University), and SHI Ce (CUHK). The launching of China’s Super
Rich Persons (CSRP) dataset is one of the highlights in this fieldwork year’s
enterprising events. I feel fortunate and grateful to be part of this research
wave.
Finally I owe deep gratitudes to all those people who have helped me over
this long process of thesis completion. I’d like to thank them all, particularly
my friends, staffs, and faculties at LSE, and my family members. They make
the whole process a learning experience for me.
6
Abstract of Chapters
This thesis contains three independent research papers on political econ-
omy of development with a unified focus on leadership and decision makings
within real world environments. The first chapter deals with country-cross
experience using authoritarian turnovers, defined as a transition within non-
democratic regimes, as natural experiments. The final two chapters consists
of China-based papers within contemporary historical context, i.e., the pe-
riod since China’s reform and opening in the late 70s. The second chapter
investigates the wealth creation and accumulating class, pinned down by
global billionaires, people who have estimated wealth exceeding 1 billion U.S
dollars based on Forbes’ database. The final chapter considers a critical the-
oretical along with a political struggle between two competing views on the
interplay between market economy and socialism in the mid 80s. Using Deng
Xiaoping’s southern talk in 1992 as an ending mark of that grand debate over
the future institutional course of China, the third chapter seeks to provide
a descriptive study on the effect of political shock on the social composi-
tion of super rich class in China, utilizing a database compiled from Chinese
Academy of Social Science (CASS).
Chapter 1, Does Authoritarian Turnover Deliver, using authoritarian
turnovers (ATs) as natural experiments, investigates the institutional transi-
tion effects from one nondemocratic regimes to another. I ask the following
question: does authoritarian turnover produce on average positive growth
effects? Using this exercise, I attempt to provide another test on the nexus
between democratization and growth. An emerging idea from this research is
that authoritarian turnover is as likely to happen as a transition into democ-
racy. To determine this, a new panel dataset from authoritarian regimes
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between 1950 and 2014 was constructed. My estimates suggest that those
authoritarian turnovers have an adverse small average growth effect. This
implies that by failing to take into account authoritarian turnovers, democ-
ratization literature might have underestimated the effect of transition into
democracy. From a decomposition analysis, it is determined that transitions
into party regimes can once in a while deliver better outcomes than transi-
tions into other authoritarian systems. In general, however, the transition
to party regimes on average cannot deliver a better growth outcome than
democratization.
Chapter 2, Becoming Global Billionaires from Mainland China: Theory
and Evidence, studies the the set of billionaires from mainland China, dis-
cusses how their social origins affect their financing patterns. Guided by
a proposed conceptual framework relating socio-political backgrounds of the
billionaire entrepreneurs to their observable financing decisions, I show, under
conditions of an open economy, grassroots billionaire entrepreneurs (e.g., Jack
Ma) could attenuate political economy as well as financial frictions via capi-
tal injections from foreign venture capitalists. Building a unique database, I
find, using a human equation, that (i) the politically unconnected billionaire
entrepreneurs financed by foreign venture capitalists are more likely to float
their companies outside mainland China (mainly in Hong Kong and the U.S),
use offshore financing vehicles, and enter into innovative sectors; and (ii) the
politically connected global billionaire entrepreneurs, however, are strongly
associated with a record of state-owned enterprise (SOE) restructuring.
Chapter 3, Serving the People or the People’s Note: On the Political Econ-
omy of Talent Allocation, discusses the welfare-improving impact of Deng Xi-
aoping’s Southern Talks, through better allocation of talents. An efficient al-
location of talents through occupational choice is central to modern economic
growth. Removal of developmental barriers unfavorable to entrepreneurship
might be a plausible channel for China’s superb economic performance. Us-
ing a newly compiled data on China’s Super Rich Persons (CSRP), the re-
gression kink (RK) design reports supportive evidence on the politically in-
duced structural change in the social compositions of entrepreneurs using as
an event shock from Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks: consistent with pro-
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market talent allocation framework (i) the share of super-rich entrepreneur
having state sector experience and party membership declines; (ii) the ef-
fects on the attributes of the parental father of the entrepreneurs are rather
limited.
In short, the three chapters as a whole contribute to a study of political
economy of development using real world experiences. At the core of each of
the chapter, the central theme of the paper is unified under the interactions
between decision makings of leaders, whether they are political or business
leaders, and institutional environments. In chapter 1, the average effect of
authoritarian turnovers, which by definition are associated with replacement
of leaders, could be interpreted as selection effects of leaders in that setting.
In chapter 2, the minting of Chinese billionaires is more or less made possible
by the institutional innovations offered by an open economy in which offshore
vehicles and other sets of financial innovations are available. In chapter 3,
the shaping of a wealth creation class could be attributable to a political
resolution of competing ideals and plans in a unique historical setting.
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Chapter 1
Does Authoritarian Turnover Deliver?
1.1 Introduction
Modern political economists who have attempted to examine the growth
effect of institutions have built a long tradition of studying the long term
outcomes of democracy and dictatorship (Barro, 1996). A recent analysis
by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) reports a 1% increase in annual per
capita growth following an event of democratization. As this paper attempts
to show, breakdown of authoritarian regimes may not necessarily result in
democratization.
A number of observations could be made in light of the political and eco-
nomic development of Iran. For instance, the left panel in 1.1 plots the GDP
per capita of Iran between 1954 and 2014 extracted from Penn Table 9.0, su-
perimposed by vertical lines, which represent leadership turnovers from the
Archigos database. The right panel of the same Figure plots the time series
of Polity IV score for the same period. The significant dip of Polity IV score
in the period 1979-1980 captures the transitional period from pro-American
Shah, to new ruling elites of Islam clerics. When the country switches its
helmsman from one group to another with opposed ideology, the standard
measures of Polity IV can be observed to have remained in the negative re-
gion after smoothing (compare the blue with the red line in the right panel,
the raw and adjusted Polity IV scores). In a standard cross-country regime
transition framework where a binary measure for regime type is coded and
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the differences among authoritarian regimes are discarded, regime transition
like the Iranian revolution in 1979 would be interpreted as an indicator of
a smooth transition. If the end of an authoritarian regime does not lead
to democracy, do turnovers like the 1979 Iranian Revolution affect economic
and political outcomes? Can mere replacements of authoritarianism deliver
hope for a nation’s progress? If so, how do these effects relate to varieties
and differences within authoritarian regimes?
The standard treatment in the comparison between democracy and dicta-
torship is to take the latter as being more or less the same, building a binary
variable for regime classifications. Besley and Kudamatsu (2008), however,
argue that “heterogeneity in the working of autocratic institutional arrange-
ments comes out of a broad of theoretical treatments”. In this paper, the
conceptualization of regime1 follows Geddes et al. (2014) by defining it as
“basic informal and formal rules that determine what interests are repre-
sented in the authoritarian leadership group and whether these interests can
constrain the dictator”. Therefore, an authoritarian turnover is character-
ized as a transition of leadership from one authoritarian regime to another
regime based on the classification rule from Geddes et al. (2014)2. This pa-
per, thus, estimates the impact of authoritarian turnovers and reports that
non-significant impacts following Ats on some political-economic measures.
By constructing a panel dataset on authoritarian regimes, the study of au-
thoritarian turnovers can, I believe, contribute to knowledge of the varieties
of authoritarianism and its impact on subsequent political-economic devel-
opment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II presents a survey of
the literature. Section III discusses the procedure of constructing a new panel
dataset. It then documents three case studies among the database regarding
1It is noted that the definition of a regime is not unique. Besley and Kudamatsu
(2008), along the lines of the democratization literature, define it as “a period in which
authority characteristics of a country stay the same, according to the POLITY IV data
set.” To take a step towards understanding the workings of authoritarian regimes, this
work departs from the regime conceptualization from the democratization literature. The
conceptualization of Geddes et al. (2014) is more suited to the study of ATs in my context.
2To be specific, the classification rule based on “leadership group” is conceptually
similar to the idea of the selectorate (De Mesquita et al., 2005).
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authoritarian turnovers for conceptual clarification purposes. Within that
section, simple OLS estimates of the effect on GDP per capita are presented.
Section IV reports a few findings with a dynamic panel analysis. Aided by
a dynamic panel estimator, I estimate the average effect of authoritarian
turnovers and the decomposition effect among three kinds of regimes for
economic growth. Afterwards, I provide brief estimates of the impact on
other outcomes. The final section concludes with my findings.
1.2 Related Literature
A body of historians, political scientists and, more recently, economists
have tried to answer questions relating to the dictatorship and democracy.
Previous papers consider the effect of institutions on economic development
using cross-sectional data from multiple countries (Hall and Jones, 1999;
Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992; Barro, 1996; Przeworski et al., 1995). Relying
on panel data structure and being clear about identification strategies and
statistical robustness, recent studies using democratization as event shocks
(Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2019) report positive
growth effects associated with post-democratization (Rodrik and Wacziarg,
2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2009).
A different strand of the literature concentrates on a variety of authori-
tarian systems and how they compare with democratic institutions3. Theo-
retical works that have attempted to explore this comparison (Olson, 2000;
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) have primarily focused on failure and incapac-
ity of authoritarian regimes to address commitment problems. On the other
hand, political and economic vulnerabilities in authoritarian regimes have
been underscored in studies that used direct modeling: loyalty-competence
trade-off (Egorov and Sonin, 2011), politics of fear (Miquel, 2007), twin prob-
lems of power-sharing and control (Svolik, 2012), commitment and credibil-
ity problems (Myerson, 2008), and political survival (De Mesquita et al.,
3Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) provide a comprehensive survey on the economic effects
of autocratic regimes.
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2005). Studies on hybrid regimes in the post-cold war era highlights the
need to consider “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2010)
and “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002).
The broad effects of institution transitions, however, are not restricted to
economic outcomes. Besley and Persson (2011) propose a theoretical frame-
work to capture the idea that measures of state capacity are correlated with
and clustered around the level of economic development. Dell et al. (2018)
reports a positive impact from a previously strong centralized state in Dai
Viet villages through public goods provision and redistribution. Using per-
sonnel data from the British Empire, Xu (2019) finds that countries exhibit
lower fiscal capacity if they had been exposed to stronger patronage in the
colonial period.
Using the information on attempted and successful coups, Meyersson
(2015) estimates the effect of coups on economic development for both democ-
racy and dictatorship. Of interest to this paper is Meyersson (2015)’s result
that “coups taking place in autocratic regimes show imprecise and sometimes
positive effects on growth”. This paper, however, incorporates and moves be-
yond all relatable episodes of coup when a new authoritarian regime has to
emerge as an aftermath of the collapse of an old regime.
Papers (Jones and Olken, 2005) on the link between leadership turnovers
and economic development are also related to my project. The conceptu-
alization of regimes based on Geddes et al. (2014) distinguishes between
regime turnover (AT or democratization) and leadership turnover. Regime
turnover (e.g., AT) is accompanied by leadership turnover. Even so, lead-
ership turnover might not result in regime turnover in the sense of Geddes
et al. (2014)4.
4This point will be clarified in the case study session.
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1.3 The Political-Economic Impacts of Au-
thoritarian Turnovers
This section sets off with a discussion of the processes involved in the con-
struction of a panel dataset of relatable authoritarian turnover events from
1946 through 2010. From this period, three case studies on authoritarian
turnovers are selected: Iran (1979); Rwanda (1994); and Algeria (1992).
1.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The annual panel dataset constructed from various sources consists of
163countries from 1950 to 2010, although not all variables for each country
could be accessed for the entire years of focus. In line with the guidelines
used by Geddes et al. (2014), I gather the classifications of authoritarian
regimes, which specify the exact year of political turnovers. All regimes in
the sample are classified three:military, party-based, or personal regimes5 as
recommended by Geddes et al. (2014).
The event of the authoritarian turnover, as a binary, focuses on situations
where one authoritarian regime is replacing another for the same country
code. When a turnover event occurs, the binary variable switches from zero
to one until the new regime meets its eventual end. The unit of analysis
is country-year. All democratic country-year units are removed so that the
comparison is within the group of authoritarian regimes. Table 1.1 offers a
summary view of the country-year events used in the sample from 1946 to
5An early paper on classification among authoritarian regimes can be sourced from
Geddes (1999). A military regime refers to a dictatorship led by a military body dominated
by one particular ethnic group. A party regime is a dictatorship led by a dominant ruling
party. A dictatorship ruled by a single person unconstrained either by the military and
the party is considered to be a personal regime. Monarchy regime, unlike Geddes et al.
(2014), is viewed as a specific form of personal dictatorship for an operation reason. Given
that monarchy regimes are infrequent cases many of which occurred before 1945 and that
some anomaly cases (e.g, Iran 1979 in Geddes et al. (2014)) have a missing category, this
paper groups all those episodes into a remaining category, “the others”, used as a base
in regime comparison analysis. It is noted that when matched with some controls, these
base country-year units might be dropped because of missing information.
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2010, which includes data from different regimes across the world from the
post-World War II periods6. Due to the challenges in gathering available
economic variables prior to 1950, this paper focuses on cases in Table 1.1
that can be matched with valid economic variables7.
As a standard measure of economic performance, I use (log) GDP per
capita as my main outcome variable that is drawn from the Maddison Project.
A set of country characteristics variables are also collected. A measure of pro-
ductivity at current PPPs (variable name: CTFP) is taken from Penn World
Tables (version 8.1). Giuliano et al. (2013) offers an aggregate measure of
reform index to capture the adoption of economic reforms. Standard con-
trols such as (log) total population, gross secondary enrollment, trade share
of GDP (export plus import over GDP ratio), and gross capital formation of
GDP (investments) are gathered from World Development Indicators.
From the literature on state capacity in fiscal capacity and violence, I
gather a few measures. Military capacity is proxied by military personnel
(thousands) and military expenditures divided by total population from Cor-
relates of War (COW) Project National Material Capabilities. The tax/GDP
ratio used to proxy for fiscal capacity comes from Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al.
(2013)8.
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics separately for those country-
year (s) that have experienced turnover and those that have not yet had such
an experience. After a turnover, GDP per capita, total factor productivity
(TFP), and population increase slightly. Military spending per person rises
sharply. Investment, tax, reform index, and trade share as a percentage of
GDP drop by a little.
6A permanent transition is a situation where the new regime survives by 2010 whereas a
temporary transition means that the “new” regime dies before 2010. This paper focuses on
the latter transition due to data restrictions. A permanent transition to an authoritarian
system has been rare within my time frame.
7Events prior to 1950 are dropped from my analysis due to data limitations.
8I thank Cullen Hendrix for his quick reply in pointing out this reference for me. The
data has been normalized by a factor of one-quarter.
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1.3.2 Three Case Studies
Historical contexts of turnovers are rich with complexities that manifest
themselves in a variety of transitional patterns. In this section, I present
three case studies on political turnovers used in my empirical estimation.
The objective of using empirical estimation is to distinguish the effect of
ATs from democratization, conditional on a break down of an authoritarian
regime. It also makes a distinction between the turnover of regimes (ATs)
that are used in this paper and the turnover of leaders that are used in the
leadership and growth literature. Additionally, it clarifies two kinds of events:
event sassociated with the regime (e.g., ATs) and those that are associated
with the leader(e.g., the assassination of the leader).9
Iran, 1979, Type of the regime death: peaceful transition in response to
massive demonstrations because the Shah fled the country.
The beginning and the end of the Pahlavi dynasty are classic examples of
authoritarian turnover. The regime was founded in 1925 through a military
coup that was led by Reza Shah Pahlavi after he deposed the Qajar dynasty.
In 1941, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi replaced his father after the British and
Soviet forces occupied Iran during World War II and abdicated the previous
Shah. It was, however, not until 1953 that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi did
manage to gain full control of his government, courtesy of backings from the
United States and the United Kingdom. According to the Polity database
shown in Figure 1.1, this period was characterized by a negative score in
polity IV until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
The leader of the previous regime, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi over-
threw his Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and embarked on his rule
through a decree in 1953. Muhammad Reza Shah’s policy of White Revo-
lution gradually intensified social tensions through a sequence of organized
protests and arrests10. Such tensions radicalized the Shia opposition, with
Ayatollah Khomeini gradually emerging as a prominent leader of the oppo-
sition. Forced to leave the country, the succeeding leader of the new regime,
9See Jones and Olken (2009).
10See chapter 5 of Abrahamian (2008) on the white revolution and how it intensified
social as well as political conflicts.
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Khomeini, did not return to Iran from exile until thirteen years later.
In 1975, the Resurgence Party(Rastakhiz) was founded, an act that es-
calated further state control over segments of the society (p.151-154, Abra-
hamian (2008)). Crippled by political incapacity among mounting protests,
the Shah eventually fled the country on 16th, January 1979. Two weeks
later,Khomeini returned to Iran from exile. He led Iran into passing a new
constitution in December 1979, which marked the start of a new authoritar-
ian regime.
In short, Iran 1979 coded by Geddes et al. (2014) data was seen as a prime
example of non-democratizing regime turnover and leadership turnover. The
subsequent regime, led by Khomeini, still received a small negative value in
the polity score, justifying the concept of an authoritarian turnover.
Rwanda, 1994, Type of the regime death: external violence as a result
of the capture of the capital of the old regime by rebellion forces.
During, and since World War I, Rwanda became part of the Belgian
colony. Belgium had a tradition of using divided-and-rule methods in its
colony, such as pro-Tutsi policies, which antagonized the relationship between
Tutsi and Hutu groups. The perceived preferential treatment of Tutsi (14%),
which was a minority group, over the Hutu majority (85%), contributed to
a series of Hutu rebellions in 1959, forcing some 150,000 Tutsis to leave the
country. The growing intensity of ethnic animosity, with time, led to the end
of the Tutsi Monarch. The end of the Tutsi Monarch, in turn, marked the
beginning of an independent republic under Gregoire Kayibanda from the
Hutu tribe.
However, the path towards modernization of Rwanda was punctuated
with numerous episodes of authoritarian turnovers without democratization.
Juvenal Habyarimana, while serving as army chief of Staff, overthrew Pres-
ident Kayibanda through a bloodless coup in 1973, intensifying the ethnic
rifts within neighboring Burundi, home to ethnic oppositions of the Hutu
group and breeding place for future revolutionaries. From the conceptual
distinction, the 1973 coup is an event associated with the leader, not the
regime. This is a situation of leadership turnover without regime turnover.
From 1979, the Tutsi refugees and government in exile started setting up
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political organizations for a possible return to Rwanda. The Rwandan Pa-
triotic Front(RPF) was thus beginning to gather strength until October1990
when the military force under Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema invaded
the north-eastern part of the country and triggered the Rwandan Civil War.
Neither the incumbent Habyarimana government nor the opposition forces
led by RFP were able to gain a decisive victory during the civil war between
1990 and 1994. Neither the Arusha Accords in 1993 bringing democratic in-
stitutions to the country nor peace missions from the United Nations could
avert the imminent ethnic conflicts11.
The military regime chaired by Juvenal Habyarimana came to an end
when the leader was shot down, along with the president of Burundi, in an
airplane by the opposition forces on 6 April 1994. In response to the death of
its leader, the Hutu-dominant government retaliated with what came to be
known as the Rwandan genocide12, a massive ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi
population along with the execution of military leaders ,sympathizers, and
moderates.
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under Paul Kagame quickly resumed
the civil war, refusing to negotiate with the interim government. Nearly three
months later, opposition forces captured Rwanda’s capital Kigali, ending the
rule of an extremist Hutu government.
After the victory, Paul Kagame, who later became the country’s president,
served as the vice-president and minister of defence for another six years,
despite being known as the de facto leader. The switching of hands from
one authoritarian Rwandan government to another via a bloody civil war
constitutes an episode of authoritarian turnover. This also led to leadership
turnover.
Algeria, 1992, Type of the regime death: internal violence resulting from
a military coup against the old regime.
The political-economic history of Algeria after 1962 has consistently been
11Dallaire (2009) gives a personal account from Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire,
who served as the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) in 1993-1994.
12From a historical perspective, Prunier (1997) provides an analysis of the Rwandan
genocide. An alternative view is provided by Guichaoua (2015).
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plagued by irregular leadership turnovers and regime changes 13. Before its
independence movement led by theNational Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria
was a French colony until 1962. Benyoucef Benkhedda, a leader during the
Algerian War, left the post of the president of the provisional government a
few months after a faction within FLN led by Ahmed Ben Bella challenged
his leadership. In 1965, Houari Boumediene, who was the defense minister
and a leader of the military faction at the time, deposed Bella and put him
under house arrest. Bella had only served for just about three years as the
country’s president14.
Boumediene governed Algeria from June 1965 until his death in 1978.
Despite his bloodless coup against Bella, Boumediener maintained much of
the military influence within the old structure of Algeria. He had ruled the
country through aone-party state.
After a brief interim by Rabah Bitat, the acting President following
Boumediene’s death, Chadli Bendjedid, an army moderate, took over the
presidency15. During Bendjedid’s reign in the 1980s, after a set of policy
blunders and failure to deliver the country from a menacing economic crisis,
he began to dismantle the political foundation of FLN system in the hope of
facilitating a transition into a multi-party democracy.
The opening up of the political system inspired the founding of the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) party by 1989. FIS later swept more than half of the
votes in the local elections within less than a year. As FIS continued to make
its progress towards victory in legislative elections, the military intervened
in February 1992, ousting Bendjedid, and asked Muhammad Boudiaf, an
exiled member from a faction of FLN, to become the chairman of the High
Council of State. In less than four months, Boudiaf was assassinated by his
bodyguard with Islamist sympathies. In Geddes et al. (2014), tthe FLN one-
party regime ended after the resignation of Bendjedid because a one-party
regime was given away to a military regime led by a group of Army ocers16.
13See Evans and Phillips (2007); McDougall (2006) for independent historical analysis.
14This bloodless coup is also a case of leadership turnover without regime turnover
15This is also a leadership turnover without regime turnover.
16However genuine or pretentious the subsequent elections the regimes have held; the
regime is still characterized by an authoritarian system that is somewhat different from
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The subsequent regimes were one way or the other either supported by
the military or ruled directly by generals, such as AliKafi and Liamine Zer-
oual. Throughout the 1990s, Algeria endured a period of political chaos and
terrorism. Much of the conflict was between the incumbent government and
a number of opposing Islamic groups that emerged after the dissolution of
FIS party. Not until the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as an independent
candidate supported by the army in 1999 did the politics of Algeria stabilize.
Since then, Abdelaziz Bouteflika governed the country as the president for
four terms before he stepped down in 2019.
Taking stock from the three case studies above, I have demonstrated the
interrelationships among regime turnover, democratization, and leadership
turnover. In terms of event analysis, I distinguish events that are associated
with the regime and those associated with the leadership17.
1.4 Empirical Results
The empirical results of the paper are presented in four steps. First,
the analysis starts with a discussion of simple OLS estimation using the
level equation. Second, by pooling all the country-year together without
differentiating the types of authoritarian regimes, this paper estimates the
pooled average effect of authoritarian turnover using dynamic panel methods.
This presentation is followed by consideration of the decomposition effects
based on regime type. Finally, the dynamic panel method is applied to other
outcome variables as an exploration of potential mechanisms.
the FLN past.
17Take coups as an example, a situation where a leadership turnover occurs. Concep-
tually, there are two kinds of coups: coups without regime change, either democratizing
or turnover, and coups that bring down the regime immediately.
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1.4.1 The Unconditional and Conditional Impact of
Authoritarian Turnovers
The unconditional effects: This section presents the unconditional esti-
mates of the impact of ATs on GDP per capita, using the following formu-
lation, fit by OLS:
yc,t+j = α + γTc,t + ηc + δt + εc,t for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (1.1)
where yc,t represents GDP per capita and Tc,t gives the timing of authoritar-
ian turnover for country c at time t, as described before. δt represents the
common year effects across the globe. ηc gives the fixed yet unobservable
country effects. The remaining shocks belong to εc,t.
Table 1.3, column (1)- (5), reports estimate of equation (1.1), using the
full sample (2,473 observations, 163 countries, up to 66 years), giving esti-
mates of time structure of impact from ATs. The result is driven mostly
by cross-country variation after controls for common year and fixed country
effects. The OLS estimated coefficient γ for contemporaneous effect is a non-
significant effect of 1.4% (standard error = 1.7%) in the negative (column
1). The estimated effect of ATs on future one year GDP per capita stays at
the same level as immediate impact (column 2). Forward into the future, the
two year future effect drops from −1.7% (standard error = 1.8%) (column
3) to −2.6% (standard error = 1.9%) in three years (column 4), to −3.2%
(standard error = 1.9%) in four years, and finally to −3.3% (standard error =
1.9%) in five years. The fact that none of the level estimates are statistically
significant suggests a small negative effect from ATs from the impacting year
up to five years in the future.
There are several caveats, however, with this result. First, the static
model might fail to take into account the historical dependence of GDP per
capita. Lagged dependent variables are usually strong predictors of current
value. The omission of these lagged terms could result in an omitted variable
bias, which confounds the estimation of the turnover effect. The purpose of
using dynamic panel techniques is to assess the stability of this result to the
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inclusion of lagged dependent variables.
The conditional effects: Beyond unconditional effects using OLS, the fol-
lowing dynamic panel method is applied to estimate the average effect of an
authoritarian turnover, taking into account of the conditional convergence
effects:
yc,t = α +
p!
j=1
αjyc,t−j + γTc,t +
q!
i=1
βixc,t−i + δt + ηc + εc,t (1.2)
where yc,t denotes the log of real GDP per capita for country c at year t
18.
Tc,t is a binary variable with unity value characterizing the year in which and
afterwards an old authoritarian regime is replaced by a new authoritarian
regime. xc,t−i characterizes the control variable for country c at year t, with
ith lag. Parameters ηc and δt stand for standard unobservable country and
year fixed effects, respectively. The key parameter of interest in this paper
is γ, the authoritarian turnover effects. In the growth and convergence liter-
ature, adding lagged dependent variables can induce an estimate of long-run
impacts. To do so, I assume that the GDP dynamics for equation (1.2) sat-
isfies the condition for stationary. Thus, the long-run average effect of an





To achieve a consistent estimation of the turnover effect in the presence
of country fixed effects, OLS estimator is known to suffer from a large Nickell
bias (Nickell, 1981) particularly when the estimated effects are small. The
main results are derived from the standard approach to dynamic panel esti-
mation through Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991)19. To
caution against misspecification error, I report the results from the AR(2)
test for specification checks. To ensure that the “too many instruments”
problems can be minimized, I decide no more than eight lags might be a
good balance after some experimentation. Finally, three assumptions are
18The literature has debated over whether inclusion of a constant is necessary with
fixed effects from country and years. In unreported regression, the concern has shown
limited impact on the core estimates of the paper.
19In the rest of the paper, Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is short-
handed as AB estimator. AB estimator uses lagged dependent variables to instrument for
the differenced dependent variable in the corresponding equation.
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required for consistent estimation and interpretation of my results: (i) the









= 0, for s ≥ t, and (iii)









= 0, for s ≥ t. Simply put, the condition of predeterminedness re-
quires that historical shocks up to the event at time t can be correlated with
the binary with which contemporaneous and future shocks are uncorrelated.
In the appendix, I relate the estimates of this paper and compare them
with the growth effects of transition into democracy from the democratization
literature to enhance the interpretation of the estimated effects.
1.4.2 The Conditional Growth Effect of Authoritarian
Turnovers
Table 1.4 presents the pooled conditional dynamic effect from authoritar-
ian turnover. In column (1), I estimate equation (1.2) using the fixed effect
“within estimators” without control variables for one lag of GDP dynamics.
The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The estimated co-
efficients of −0.1% (standard error = 0.6%) on authoritarian turnover are
insignificant at the level of 5%. Column (2) and (3) augment the specifica-
tions with two and four lags of GDP dynamics. The estimated effects are
−0.3% (standard error = 0.6%) and −0.6% (standard error = 0.5%), re-
spectively. In each of the three specifications, the within R2 is high around
0.95.
Starting with column (4) to column (6), I apply AB estimators corrected
for heteroskedasticity using one, two, and four lagged dependent variables,
respectively20. As a check against specification errors, the p-values associated
with AR(2) tests should not reject the null hypothesis21. This holds for the
20In unreported regressions, the number of lags used to instrument the lagged dependent
variable in the first-differenced equation is robust to selection of six, ten, and twelve lags.
21The test of autocorrelation for the second order is applied to the residuals in differ-
ences. In this case, ∆εc,t is related naturally to ∆εc,t−1 via εc,t−1. Therefore, AB type of
estimates rely on checking second-order correlation in differences. For a correctly specified
AB model, it shall reject the significance of second-order correlation at a given level.
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three specifications with values of 0.208, 0.754, and 0.563.
An examination of the coefficients from column (4) to (6) indicates a
mixed picture: while specifications (4) and (5) report a non-significant result
stronger than 5%, column (6), with four lags of GDP dynamics, however,
suggests an average adverse effect in both the short (p = 0.003) and long-
run (p = 0.005). In the long run, the gap can be as large as 20% based
on AB estimator with four past lags of GDP (column 6, Table 1.4). An
effect of −3.1% (standard error = 1%) can be quite large. This evidence is
somewhat weakened by Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. In unreported
regressions using BB estimator and four lags (column 6 in Table Table 1.4),
the estimated coefficient for turnover is −2% with a standard deviation of
0.5% (p-value = 0.734). Another estimate is offered by Arellano and Bover
(1995). In unreported regressions, the estimated coefficient for turnover is
−1.1% with a standard deviation of 0.7% (p-value = 0.096). In sum, the
magnitude of the estimates using panel techniques ranges from −3.1% to
−0.01%.
Since only GDP dynamics are included, the concerns over whether poten-
tial time-varying confounding factors could drive the convergence of growth
outcome, in addition to past lags of GDP dynamics, are considered. I inves-
tigate these threats in the following table.
Table 1.5 (see a similar exercise in Table 3, Papaioannou and Siourou-
nis (2008)) augments the baseline specifications through a number of time-
varying controlling variables In each specification, the lagged one of the con-
trol variables is included in the specification. In addition, the lagged one of
the control variable is assumed also to be predetermined22.
Each of the specifications has passed the AR(2) test. In column (1) of
Table 1.5, the estimated impact is close to 0.0% (standard error = 0.8%)
using (log) population controls. The average impact is found to be weakly
positive with tax over GDP ratios (column 3) at 0.0% (standard error = 1.1%)
22Experiments with not making this assumption find no fundamental change using AB
estimator other than (6). In unreported regressions, the p-value on AT by repeating (1)-(5)
are: 0.659, 0.960, 0.101, 0.186, 0.779. The last column (6) gives an estimated coefficient
of -0.027 with a standard error of 0.010 (p-value = 0.007), a value implying an even larger
negative effect.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 29
, and TFP (column 5) at 0.0% (standard error = 1.0%). The negative values
are estimated from investment over GDP (column 2) at −0.5% (standard
error = 0.9%) and trade of GDP controls at −1.3% (standard error = 1.0%).
The only significant estimate comes from military expenditure per capita
as a proxy for military capacity in column (6) at an estimated effect of
−1.7% (standard error = 0.7%), significant at 5%. In short, the range of
magnitude is from −1.7% to less than 0.1%. The result shows that across
a range of time-varying control variables, AB estimators report overall that
the estimated impact from turnovers is small negative values.
Taking stock from this section, although many specifications present small
negative and positive effects that are not reaching 5% benchmark, the average
growth effect for ATs appears to a small negative effect (particularly, the
estimates from Table 1.5 column 6 using military expenditure as control).
1.4.3 The Role of Regime Type
How does the role of the regime type matter for post-transition devel-
opment? Here, I proceed by relating the type of authoritarian regimes to
political and economic outcomes23. In what follows, I investigate the pos-
sibility of differences among authoritarian regimes after experiencing ATs.
The decomposition exercise captures the effect of transition into a certain
kind of regime. There are three kinds of possible types for this analysis: the
personal, the military, and the party regime, using the remaining category
as the base24. I consider the following estimators: fixed effect estimator,
AB estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) (shorthanded as BB) estimator.
BB estimator generalizes from AB estimator with additional level equations.
Additionally Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator, another variant of AB
estimator, which applies the forward orthogonal deviation transformation
23The classification of varieties of authoritarian regimes originates from Geddes (1999).
It is noted here that whether or not personal regimes form a distinct kind of dictatorship
has been debated (Cheibub et al., 2010). In the appendix, evidence in support of regime
heterogeneity is presented from Geddes et al. (2014).
24The base are those country-years which have regime value as the “others” including
the monarchy and hard-to-classify ones.
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rather than differencing, is considered. For each specification, four GDP lags
are still used as predetermined controls.
Table 1.6 presents results on regime heterogeneity. Column (1) using a
fixed effect estimator reports that compared with the base, transition into a
party regime can generate an increase of GDP per capita by 0.9% (standard
error = 0.8%). Contrary to the positive outcome of transitioning into a
party regime, the effect of transition into a personal regime is estimated to
be negative at −1.6% (standard error = 0.8%). The effect of transition into
a military regime is a small negative at −0.1% (standard error = 0.7%).
Each of the specifications in column (2)-(4) has passed the AR(2) test.
Overall, these three specifications reach the same overall result using dynamic
panel techniques: a small value that cannot reject zero in a significant way
for each of the individual estimates. Column (2) using AB estimator finds
an overall negative effect for a transition into all kinds of regimes with a
transition into the party regime slightly better. BB estimator in column (3)
reports an increase of GDP per capita by 0.6% (standard error = 0.5%) by
a transition into a party regime. The Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator
(column 4) indicates an estimator that lies somewhere in between that of the
AB and BB estimators.
Compared with the base, if any of these specifications can detect evi-
dence of regime differences regarding political-economic performance after
turnovers, the coefficient associated with the type of the regime could be
compared with each other. Digging a bit, although none of these estimated
coefficients individually can be significantly different from 5%, the decom-
position analysis reports that party regimes have larger values than other
kinds of regimes and more chances of getting positive values, compared with
the base. For all four specifications, the pairwise test between transition
into a personal and party regime gets a p-value of 0.0357 under the fixed
effect specification (column 1). Pairwise tests between transition into a per-
sonal and military regime cannot reject at 5% across for all the specification.
This holds for the pairwise test between transition into a party and military
regime.
Can the estimates of conditional growth effects from Table 1.6 be affected
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by time-varying factors? To take into account this issue, I repeat my anal-
ysis using BB estimator controlling for (log) of the population, investment
ratio, the tax share of GDP, the trade share of GDP, measure of TFP, and
the share of military personnel in the population. In each of the following
specifications, as in the previous section, lagged one of the control variable is
included in each of the specifications other than military capacity which uses
two measures. All specifications use BB estimators because these estimators
use observations more effectively by combining both level and differenced
equations. The lagged one of the control variable is assumed, as before, also
to be predetermined.
Results are presented in Table 1.7. Each of the specifications has passed
the AR(2) test. Column (1) uses lagged (log) population as a predetermined
control, the estimate for party regime is significantly positive at 5% compared
with the base. It means that compared with the base, transition into a
party delivers about 1.1% growth per capita, using lagged (log) population
as control. The pairwise test between party regime and the other two regime
types are markedly different (p=0.0129 for personal regime p=0.0645 for the
military regime)
Using investment ratio as a predetermined control, column (2) reports
a rejection from a pairwise test between party regimes and the other two
regimes at 10% (p value for military = 0.0724, p value for personal = 0.0674).
Across column (2)-(6), the effect of transition into party regimes is a small
positive value compared with the base: 1.5% (standard error = 0.8%) for
lagged one of investment over GDP, 0.9% (standard error = 0.5%) for lagged
one of tax over GDP, 1.5% (standard error = 0.9%) for lagged one of trade
over GDP, and 0.8% (standard error = 0.5%) for lagged one of share of
military personnel.
Based on a comparative analysis, the decomposition analysis reveals nu-
anced differences between the transition into party regimes and others, de-
pending on the kinds of the specifications, compared with the base. It appears
that the overall negative results from ATs as reported in the previous section
are mainly driven by poor growth performance resulting from transitions into
personal regimes. Compared with other kinds of authoritarian regimes, tran-
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sitions into party regimes might result in good outcomes in some situations.
On average, the effect of transition into party regime underperforms that of
democratization, from the decomposition exercise in the appendix, through
comparisons with estimates from that literature.
1.4.4 Potential Mechanisms
Does authoritarian turnover affect economic development through other
outcome variables25? In this section, I explore the impact of authoritarian
turnovers on other outcome variables as plausible mechanisms, which could
affect economic development. The estimator used in this section would be
AB-estimator. I consider the (pooled) and decomposition effects of ATs on
tax, investment, trade, TFP, the share of military personnel, and reform
Index using the following specification.
To take into account the conditional effects of GDP dynamics on other
outcome variables, I include four lags of GDP dynamics in each estimation
as well as assume them to be predetermined. For each of the outcomes as
the dependent variable of interest, only one lag of itself is included, assuming
also predeterminedness.
Panel A of Table 1.8 presents the pooled effect of AT. Each of the spec-
ifications has passed the AR(2) test. Column (1) reports that on average
authoritarian turnover decreases investment share of GDP by 0.3% (stan-
dard error = 0.5%). Such effect is accompanied by a decrease in the share
of trade over GDP 0.1% (standard error = 2%), and TFP index by 1.1%
(standard error = 0.8%). Column (2) finds that the effect of ATs on tax
over GDP is on the magnitude of 1.1% (standard error = 0.9%). The small
positive effect is also witnessed in the share of military personnel (column 5)
and the reform index (column 6).
Panel B presents the decomposition analysis compared with the base on
the other outcome variables. Each of the specifications has passed through
the AR(2) test. In column (1), compared with the base, transition into party
25Some of them might be interpreted as a proxy for state capabilities.
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regimes increases investment over GDP by 0.5% (standard error = 0.7%),
while transition into military and personal regimes experiences a negative ef-
fect, by −0.8% (standard error = 0.6%) and −0.1% (standard error = 0.7%).
A pairwise test strongly rejects the equality of effects between transition into
party and military regimes (p = 0.0167). The effects on tax over GDP are
rather homogeneous across three kinds of regimes (column 2). This is indeed
true for the impact on trade over GDP ratio (column 3) where the average
impact for all three kinds of regimes, compared with the base, is negative. In
column (4), the pairwise tests strongly reject the equality of effects on TFP
between a transition into party and military regime (p = 0.0508) and between
the transition into a party and personal regime (p = 0.0380). The effect on
TFP by transition into a party regime gives an increase of 1.5% (standard
error = 10.4%) while the estimated effect on TFP reports a decline of −1.9%
(standard error = 1.3%) for a transition into the personal regime and −0.1%
(standard error = 0.9%) for the military regime. Column (5) and column
(6) report homogeneity of effects for the share of military personnel and the
reform index. None of the equality tests in these two specifications can reject
at a 5% significance level.
1.5 Conclusion
In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in understanding the
impact of institutional changes on economic and political outcomes. In turn,
a strand of research literature has attempted to look at the nexus between
democratization and growth. Correspondingly, other strands have concen-
trated on leadership and economic growth literature. In using AT as an
event shock in this present research, I attempt to differentiate between event
shock associated with the regime and those associated with the leader. In
addition, I show the need to distinguish between political turnover among
authoritarian regimes and democratization in an estimation work.
This paper, therefore, estimates the impact of authoritarian turnovers on
growth using a dataset on authoritarian regimes. On average, the growth
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effects are mostly small negative values. This could mean that the actual
growth effect following democratization is even higher. A decomposition
analysis reveals some differences among the types of authoritarian regimes in
which party regimes could prevail better in certain situations. Furthermore,
my analysis implies that the growth effect of transition into a party regime,
in general, cannot surpass that of democratization.
Future follow-up research could benefit from the knowledge of the variety
of outcomes identified in this research to illuminate the workings of author-
itarian regimes further, in order to compare authoritarian regimes within
themselves and those that are institutional hybrids.
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Figure 1.1: Economic Development and Polity Score for Iran: 1959-2014
GDP per capita Polity IV Score
Source: GWF, POLITY IV, Archigos, Penn Table 9.0. The vertical line denotes leadership
turnover.
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Table 1.1: Cases of ATs: 1946-2010
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year
Afghanistan 1973 Cambodia * 1979 Guinea 1984 Nicaragua 1979
Afghanistan 1978 Cameroon * 1983 Guinea † 2008 Niger 1974
Algeria * 1992 Cen African Rep 1965 Guinea Bissau 1980 Nigeria 1993
Argentina 1955 Cen African Rep 1979 Haiti 1956 Pakistan 1958
Argentina 1958 Cen African Rep 1981 Haiti 1986 Pakistan 1977
Argentina 1966 Chad 1975 Haiti 1988 Panama 1982
Armenia * 1998 Chad * 1990 Honduras 1971 Paraguay 1948
Bangladesh 1975 Colombia 1953 Indonesia 1966 Paraguay 1954
Bangladesh 1982 Congo/Congo-Brz 1963 Iran * 1979 Rwanda 1973
Belarus * 1994 Congo/Congo-Brz 1968 Iraq 1958 Rwanda * 1994
Benin 1963 Congo/Zaire * 1997 Iraq 1963 Sierra Leone 1968
Benin 1965 Cuba * 1959 Iraq 1968 Sierra Leone 1992
Benin 1967 Dominican Rep 1962 Iraq 1979 Sudan 1985
Benin 1969 Dominican Rep 1965 Ivory Coast 1999 Syria † 1951
Bolivia † 1946 Ecuador 1972 Ivory Coast * 2000 Syria 1958
Bolivia 1951 Egypt * 1952 Kyrgyzstan 2005 Syria * 1963
Bolivia 1952 El Salvador 1948 Kyrgyzstan † 2010 Thailand † 1947
Bolivia 1964 El Salvador 1982 Laos 1960 Thailand 1957
Bolivia 1969 Ethiopia 1974 Lesotho 1986 Turkey 1960
Bolivia 1971 Ethiopia * 1991 Liberia 1980 Uganda 1971
Burkina Faso 1966 Gambia * 1994 Libya * 1969 Uganda 1979
Burkina Faso 1980 Georgia 1992 Madagascar 1972 Uganda * 1985
Burkina Faso 1982 Ghana 1966 Madagascar 1975 Vietnam South † 1963
Burkina Faso * 1987 Guatemala 1958 Mali 1968 Yemen 1962
Burundi 1966 Guatemala 1963 Mauritania 1978 Yemen 1967
Burundi 1987 Guatemala 1966 Mauritania 2005 Yemen 1974
Cambodia 1970 Guatemala 1970 Myanmar * 1988 Yemen * 1978
Cambodia 1975 Guatemala 1985 Nepal 1951
Note: This table reports the events of authoritarian regime turnovers given by years
and countries, according to Geddes et al. (2014). A notation of ∗ represents a permanent
transition to a durable stable authoritarian regime (regime survival as of 2010). A notation
† represents removed case for estimation due to lack of economic time series prior to or
post-treatment. The whole sample ends in 2010. From 1950-2010, there are 20 and 91
cases of permanent and temporary ATs, respectively.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Variable Treated Group Control Group
Mean N Mean N
GDP per capita 2004.23 1,439 1449.28 1,034
(1804.39) (1241.36)
(log) GDP per capita 7.295 1,439 7.042 1,034
(0.761) (0.645)
(log) Population 16.125 899 15.858 535
(1.080) (1.238)
Trade over GDP 0.465 994 0.521 601
(0.302) (0.343)
Investment over GDP 0.174 695 0.185 415
(0.086) (0.099)
TFP 0.650 422 0.618 200
(0.332) (0.432)
Average Reform Index 0.290 950 0.327 548
(0.257) (0.224)
Tax over GDP .205 994 0.213 601
(0.10) (0.11)
Share of Military Per-
sonnel




40.312 1,324 9.138 968
(119.934) (20.041)
Reform Index 0.290 950 0.329 548
(0.257) (0.224)
Notes: Database compiled by the author through multiple sources including GWF, Penn
Tables, Polity IV, and World Bank Development Indicators. Given the research design,
democratic country-years are excluded. Treated groups are those country-year (s) that
have experienced an AT. Control groups are those country-year (s) that have not yet
experienced an AT. The description and source of the variables can be found in the text
discussions.
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Table 1.3: Unconditional Effects of Authoritarian Turnovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
Dependent variable: logGDPpct
ATt -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.026 -0.032 -0.033
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant -49.229 30.759 -55.202 -55.171 -58.919 -55.122
(341.022) (339.103) (336.291) (334.245) (331.114) (327.402)
Observations 2,473 2,385 2,305 2,233 2,167 2,103
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 within 0.874 0.877 0.878 0.880 0.881 0.883
Each column represents one separate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. The
dependent variable is (log) GDP per capita. The coefficient on ATt from column (1) to (6) reports pooled OLS
estimates of authoritarian turnovers (ATt ) on growth from a contemporaneous year up to five years in the future.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.4: The Impact of ATs on Growth: Fixed Effect and Arellano-Bond
Estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: logGDPpct
ATt -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 -0.017 -0.031
∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)
logGDPpct−1 0.979
∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.070) (0.069) (0.042) (0.101) (0.093)
logGDPpct−2 -0.139 -0.037 -0.072 0.016







Constant -38.118 -52.080 -50.237
(24.175) (27.632) (26.699)
Long run effect -0.042 -0.195 -0.099 -0.061 -0.085 -0.211∗
(0.288) (0.207) (0.151) (0.062) (0.068) (0.075)
Method FE FE FE Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,385 2,301 2,147 2,301 2,222 2,074
R2 0.9553 0.9562 0.9564
p values for AR(2) 0.208 0.754 0.563
Notes: Each column represents one separate regression. The dependent variable is (log) GDP per capita. FE estimators
are within effects. AB estimators are implemented with no more than eight lags. For all specifications, country and
year effects are included.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: The Impact of ATs on Growth: A Regime Decomposition Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: logGDPpct
ATt -0.016 -0.022 -0.006 -0.017
× Personal Regime (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
ATt -0.001 -0.016 0.001 -0.010
× Military Regime (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009)
ATt 0.009 -0.013 0.006 0.000
× Party Regime (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.011)
Constant -49.999
(26.578)
Number of GDP Lags 4 4 4 4
Control Variables None None None None
Method FE Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond Arellano-Bover
R2 within 0.9567
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal = Military? 0.1285 0.6625 0.3270 0.4798
Personal = Party? 0.0357 0.6126 0.1127 0.2014
Military = Party? 0.2687 0.8736 0.4424 0.4101
Observations 2,147 2,074 2,147 2,088
p values for AR(2) 0.666 0.417 0.433
Notes: Each column represents one separate regression. The dependent variable is (log) GDP per capita.
AB, BB, and Arellano and Bover estimators are implemented with no more than 8 lags. For all speci-
fications, country and year effects are included. FE estimators are within effects. P-values are reported
for testing equality of coefficients between each two of the three types of the regime. The bases are the
“others” including the monarchy and hard-to-classify ones.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Becoming Global Billionaires from Mainland
China: Theory and Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Genuine entrepreneurship can sometimes overcome difficulties imposed by
inefficient institutions and bring out smart responses with good outcomes.
On May 5, 2013, Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba Group, made a public
speech at an event co-hosted by Alibaba Group and the Regions of Inno-
vation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) of the Graduate School of Business
at Stanford University1. Two things stood out for the newly minted global
billionaire entrepreneur. First, Ma claimed, there could never be Alibaba
without Silicon Valley. Second, before plunging into the internet industry,
Ma was an English teacher from a humble background in a country where
success is assumed to be driven purely by political connections.
Studies on Chinese political economy (Pei, 2009; Bai et al., 2014; Sham-
baugh, 2016) more often than not characterizes the Chinese party-state as
a kind of crony state capitalism, in which billionaire entrepreneurs enriched
themselves through a cozy partnership with the state. Although this observa-
tion is partially consistent with this research in showing that the channeling
1Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (2013,




mechanism where crony capitalistic factors are prevalent might play a role
through SOE restructuring, a key finding of this paper is to document a
missing mechanism through which grassroots entrepreneurs could use the
foreign financing channel via outside venture capitalists (VC) as a way of
attenuating both political economy and financial friction despite financial
underdevelopment and political bias within mainland China2. By assessing
the impact of socio-political backgrounds on financing decisions of the global
billionaires from mainland China, the net worth of persons with more than
one billion USD according to the World’s Billionaires database, Forbes, this
paper provides new evidence on the effect of political connections on finan-
cial decisions, explicitly taking into account the impact of foreign financing
channel, among the set of global billionaire entrepreneurship from mainland.
The analysis of global billionaire entrepreneurs from mainland China is
consistent with the ongoing discussions on Chinese entrepreneurs (Djankov
et al., 2006; Li et al., 2012)3. The existence of self-made billionaire en-
trepreneurs in internet business4 from my database - Jack Ma (Alibaba),
Pony Ma (Tencent), Robin Li (Baidu), William Ding (NetEase), Richard
Liu (JD) and others - highlights the importance of integration with foreign
capitalist forces as a critical condition underpinning the economic perfor-
mance of an authoritarian state (Jiang, 2018). Based on unique data on
top of the World’s Billionaires, Forbes 2017 version and Hurun 2016 version,
this paper reports two core empirical findings: (i) the politically unconnected
billionaire entrepreneurs financed by foreign venture capitalists outside main-
land China are more likely to list their companies outside mainland China
(mainly in Hong Kong and the U.S), use offshore financing vehicles, and
enters into innovative sectors and (ii) the politically connected global billion-
aire entrepreneurs, however, are closely linked with a record of state-owned
enterprise (SOE) restructuring.
2See Ding (2000) for an early work on offshore business in China.
3For more studies on Chinese entrepreneurs and their democratizing potentials, see
Dickson et al. (2003); Tsai (2007).
4Appendix Table B.4.1 lists a few exemplary internet billionaire entrepreneurs from
mainland China, accompanied by short descriptions from the World’s Billionaires, Forbes.
These are examples of tech-driven entrepreneurs mixed with foreign VCs.
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The finding in this paper also adds new content to the literature of po-
litical economy of financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Haber
et al., 2008; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Early contributions from Baumol (1990) expanded the traditional view of
entrepreneurship, broadening its conceptual scope by incorporating “bad en-
trepreneurship” through investments in rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) activi-
ties. One contribution of this research has recorded the ability of politically
unconnected billionaire entrepreneurs to overcome the political bias against
them (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) through the systematic application of
offshore vehicles, embodied in the use of variable interest entity (VIE) struc-
tures5 as smart responses (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) operating in mainland
China6.
On the basis of these empirical findings, I constructed a political economy
model linking social and political factors to financial access in a relevant work
(Song et al., 2011), who regarded differentiated financial access as a major
friction between private entrepreneurs and state-owned firms. While Song
et al. (2011) focused their research on private internal savings as a source
for high productivity private firms, my paper emphasizes the possibility of
soliciting venture capitalists outside mainland China among billionaire en-
trepreneurs as a way of alleviating existing credit frictions when the politi-
cally unconnected entrepreneurs are excluded from the capital market, preva-
lently known in the financial development literature (Levine, 2005; Aghion
et al., 2005). Relatedly, my paper adds to the discussion of Huang (2008)
by stressing urban entrepreneurship financed by foreign VCs. Therefore, the
driving assumption underlying framework is motivated by an observation
that once foreign VCs financially support a potential grassroots entrepreneur,
a fact that is known to the party-state, the risk of asset expropriation be-
comes approximately zero. The idea that mingling with foreign investors
5See next section on the institutional context.
6For an example, the VIE structure underpinning Alibaba is shown in Appendix Figure
B.1.2. The combination of an offshore holding company in the Cayman Islands and a
variable interest entity (knowns as the VIE) within mainland China is one of the major
characteristics of the financial structure of Alibaba, a public listed company in New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), outcomes of financing decisions made by these entrepreneurs to
attenuate, if not circumvent completely, both the financial and political economy frictions.
INTRODUCTION 47
could potentially serve as a disciplinary device on the behavior for author-
itarian government, with its concern over reputation effect on development
commitments can be traced back to the developmental state literature (Ams-
den, 1992; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999), where the nature of an open
economy plays a critical role in the discipline and facilitation of catching-up
development (Lee and Lim, 2001).
In recent academic discussions, the intellectual theme of economic growth
and innovation under shadows of expropriations has been revived (Aguiar and
Amador, 2011). These papers highlight the important role of expropriation
risks from political economy and contracting frictions (Johnson et al., 2002).
Thus, economic growth in those context can be crony-capitalist (Bai et al.,
2014; Pei, 2016) at best, which is a model of economic development driven by
a cozy, if not total collusive, relationship between connected firms (Faccio,
2006; Fisman, 2001) and elites from CPC. Although this author does not
dispute the importance of property rights and strong institutions to enforce
private contracts, the documentation of global billionaires deserves empirical
discussions7.
Other authors might place more emphasis on the crony capitalist na-
ture (Calomiris et al., 2010; McGregor, 2010; Chen and Kung, 2018) of the
Chinese party-state. However, was the fact consistent with the reality that
Chinese global billionaire entrepreneurs are merely the product of corruption
and state capture? If these billionaire entrepreneurs do not create values, but
transfer public funds to their accounts, how would Masayoshi Son, a savvy
investor from the Silicon Valley, make his bet on Jack Ma? My proposed
theory, to some extent, might even imply that it is completely possible to
become global billionaire entrepreneurs from a grassroots background with-
out the help of any state-owned banks or foreign VCs as long as the pro-
ductive side (i.e., cash-generating activities) of her entrepreneurial activity
exceeds the associated inefficient costs incurred by an inefficient institution.
By establishing ties with global VCs, however, these self-made billionaire
entrepreneurs (e.g., Jack Ma) can further attenuate both their exposures to
7In some sense, the rise of global billionaires posits itself as one of the “China puz-
zles”(Xu, 2011; Allen et al., 2005).
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political economy and financial frictions by selling their shares to foreign
VCs.
The results reported in this paper are not limited to China. Companies all
over the world have benefited from political connections (Khwaja and Mian,
2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Cingano and Pinotti, 2013; Akcigit
et al., 2020). This paper presents new evidence on how receiving financial
support from foreign VCs could overcome political connections and bring
about innovation within industries.
While this paper makes a case for considering the role of foreign financing
channels, the design and outlook of the analysis are quite preliminary. There
are several limitations. First, from the perspective of external research, there
is no political connection between the spouses of the entrepreneurs and the
state. Two, as regulation over VIEs is being discussed, it is difficult to
predict whether this is a particular financial innovation in a given period or
how it would evolve and affect financing behaviors of younger generations of
entrepreneurs. Third, the treatment of the development stage of the firm is
relatively simple. The impact of political connections and foreign financing
does work through many different stages of the firm. The focus of paper has
been placed on financing rather than advising role of foreign VCs through the
knowledge spillover channel. From the data collection perspective, the coding
of the ”first-scoop of gold” experience could be messy, if not biased. Fourth,
as this paper emphasizes, the determinant of foreign VCs supports might be
more than social and political factors. The industrial and commercial factor
have not been fully explored. Finally, the concerns about comparability and
shifting of generations might indicate that the success of Jack Ma type of
entrepreneurs could simply be an outcome of the particular historical period
with nothing definitive about the future behavior of an authoritarian regime.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines the institu-
tional context. The following section describes the simple logic underpinning
the story through a conceptual framework. Section IV presents the database
and the core empirical findings. Section V provides three case studies using
the proposed conceptual framework. The final section concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Context: The Role of Vari-
able Interest Entity (VIE)
Figure 2.1 records the empirical facts underlying this paper - the change
of the number of global billionaires from 2003 to 2018, by the World’s Bil-
lionaires database, Forbes. From a headcount of zero in 2003, the number
of a global billionaire from mainland China increased to three hundred and
seventy-three in 2018, accounting for about 60% of the total of the United
States of America. One major contribution of this paper is to examine the
space of these billionaire entrepreneurs and how the foreign financing channel
fueled their successes. Figure 2.2 shows the geographical distribution of the
billionaire entrepreneurs, most of whom are concentrated in the east-coastal
provinces and big cities (e.g., Beijing).
Among the rags-to-riches self-made entrepreneurial stories, this paper
highlights the systematic application of offshore vehicles, embodied in the use
of variable interest entity (VIE) structures. The VIE structure is known to
play a crucial role in the listing process of China’s first generation of internet
companies on the New York Stock Exchanges and NASDAQ8. The first-ever
documented case on VIE structures was the listing of Sina (NASDAQ: SINA)
as early as in 2000. Sohu (NASDAQ: SOHU), another internet company from
mainland China, founded by Charles Zhang, Ph.D. in experimental physics
at MIT, was also listed in NASDAQ at that time. By the end of 2017, most
of the Chinese companies publicly listed on the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and others were structured with VIE. For
the channeling mechanism to work, it is important to describe the working
functions of a variable interest entity.
Appendix Figure B.1.1 shows the basic structure for the variable interest
entity (VIE), the use of which underpins most of the public listing of Chinese
companies overseas, whether in private individuals or public authorities9.
Public shareholders are investors who hold the equities of overseas-listed
8An example of VIE used by Alibaba can be found in the Appendix section A
9The politico-economic effects of listings of state-owned enterprises in Hong Kong and
elsewhere are understudied.
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Chinese companies. The privately listed company usually is incorporated
as an offshore company entity (e.g., from the Cayman Islands.). With the
exception of the two offshore structures above, the rest components are finan-
cial and legal entities within Chinese jurisdiction. WFOE, the abbreviation
of wholly foreign-owned enterprise, owned by an offshore entity, is an entity
used by multinationals operating in China under the strict regulation. The
VIE is a Chinese domestic company owned by a Chinese citizen; usually, the
leading man in the company10. The establishment of legal contracts is to
bind each component into a comprehensive whole.
Underlying the secular growth in the number of global billionaires, Ap-
pendix Figure B.1.2 in the introduction represents the operating VIE struc-
ture used by Alibaba, derived from the company’s Registration Statement to
the SEC, an independent agency of the U.S government responsible for the
regulation of the securities industry. The VIE structure functions through
loan agreements, exclusive call option agreements, and others to bond dif-
ferent legal entities within and outside the Chinese border. There are five
major reasons why billionaire entrepreneurs love to utilize a VIE. First, it
opens up a way for grassroots entrepreneurs to look for finance outside of
China in the global capital market. Second, unlike a foreign-owned company
registered with the Chinese government, to some extent, the VIE structure
could bypass domestic foreign capital regulations in China, concerning the
innovation sector. Third, the users (e.g., the entrepreneurs) of VIE structure
can easily leverage these financing vehicles to float the company outside of
China’s capital market, in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ, and others. Fourth, as of 2017, the
stock exchanges of mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore Stock Ex-
change are not allowed to issue dual-class stock, which is common among high
tech companies in the United States. By listing themselves on the U.S stock
market, these Chinese companies can benefit from the financial innovations
unique to America. Finally, most of the high tech companies are backed by
non-Chinese venture capitalists, the floating of the whose invested company
10When the founder does not hold Chinese passport, the VIE would need to be owned
by a trusted employee from the senior management from the Chinese side.
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outside China provides for a convenient financial exit for these investors.
The combination of an offshore holding company in the Cayman Islands
and a variable interest entity (knowns as the VIE) within mainland China
is one of the key features of the financial structure of Alibaba. Given the
fact that whether or not these structures have been applied can be observed
in the Orbis database11, this project concentrates on two observable out-
comes, including the choice to float their companies publicly outside main-
land China or not and the decision to apply offshore entities or not. Unlike
cross-country empirical papers on global billionaires (Henrekson and Sanan-
daji, 2013; Bagchi and Svejnar, 2015), this paper is the first systematic em-
pirical assessment of global billionaire entrepreneurs from mainland China
linking social and political determinants with observable financing decisions.
The importance of these financing structures as creative human solutions for
founding and operation of a mega business in an inefficient environment shall
be emphasized.
2.3 A Theoretical Framework: Finance, En-
trepreneurship, and Politics
This section provides a conceptual framework driven by a simple logic
with an emphasis on the major driving forces linking social and political fac-
tors of an entrepreneur with her observable financial decisions. The proposed
framework is based on four features: (i) Entrepreneurs are confronted with
liquidity needs while planning their optimal investments; (ii) It is an empir-
ical fact in China and many developing countries that liquidity provisions
are limited and allocated with reference to social and political factors; (iii)
An extra financing option is available from foreign VCs in a global economy
context; and (iv) Risk of asset expropriation is superimposed in both closed
and open economy environment in addition to financial issues12.
There are two kinds of entrepreneurs (connected versus unconnected)
11Detailed information about Orbis database appears in the empirical session.
12The proofs and detailed setups of the model are left to the Appendix.
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who maximize the private return of a business projects, the process of which
may encounter liquidity needs. In a closed economy, a finite amount of
liquidity services are prioritized to the politically connected entrepreneurs
via the state-owned banking system. In an open economy, however, the
politically unconnected entrepreneurs can circumvent these frictions through
financial supports from foreign VCs13. Therefore, the conceptual framework
is formulated as an optimal investment planning problem of these two kinds
of entrepreneurs (connected versus unconnected) under two kinds of regimes
(closed versus open). The starting point is to derive the optimal contract
of each kind of the entrepreneurs subject to their future investment needs
as a result of a heterogeneous liquidity shock. Relating this to two kinds of
institutional frictions: (a) it is necessary to pay higher setup costs from the
unconnected type due to possible expropriation risks; (b) prioritized liquidity
services to connected agents.
It can be seen from (a) that the cost inefficiency from the political econ-
omy side went through the differential setup cost through high risks of as-
set expropriation for the unconnected entrepreneurs. Under this context,
only those unconnected entrepreneurs with high liquidity realization can self-
finance themselves and sustain the accumulation process. Political economy
frictions thus render an underinvestment effect on this group. Regardless of
the existence of friction from (a), financial friction from (b) from distorted
allocative credit policy creates another layer of inefficiency. This leads to the
following situation:
Politico-Economic equilibrium under a closed economy. This sec-
tion switches off risks of expropriation and focuses solely on liquidity con-
straints and how it would impact the politically connected and unconnected
agents differently in a closed regime. In this context, the liquidity provi-
sion behavior for state-owned bank is assumed to be prioritized to connected
agents. With abundance of liquidity from state-owned banks, political con-
nection will make no difference for potential entrepreneurs. In the case of
13The distinction between politically unconnected and connected entrepreneurs, when
married with capital structure view of costly external finance, offers the opportunity to
conceptualize Chinese global billionaire entrepreneurs in a simple framework.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FINANCE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
AND POLITICS 53
liquidity shortage, the allocation rule of state-owned banks discriminates
against the politically unconnected entrepreneurs at the expense of economic
efficiency. Under extreme situations, the liquidity service fails to even satisfy
the full demand from those politically connected entrepreneurs.
An application of this proposition shows that the two extreme cases of
liquidity abundance and shortage are unlikely to hold. This implies that
the preferential treatment by state-owned banks, whether due to financial
underdevelopment or other enforcement issues, generates allocative distor-
tions through liquidity provision among potential entrepreneurs in favor of
the politically connected ones.
Under an open economy, a new politico-economic equilibrium
arises with the possibility of financing support from foreign VCs.
The option to get financing from outside VCs from a foreign country at-
tenuates two major frictions faced by the grassroots entrepreneur: (a) the
risk of asset expropriation and (b) the liquidity constraints to reinvestment.
However, the sharing of private benefits at future date becomes the cost of
using an offshore vehicle. In this situation, only the most productive grass-
roots entrepreneurs with high liquidity demands would solicit financing from
foreign VCs where two major frictions are mitigated.
Innovation and Finance under Inefficient Institutions in Closed
and Open Regimes. An open economy provides an improved matching be-
tween high return projects and financial resources through better allocative
liquidity services to those productive entrepreneurs without emphasizing on
political connections. Using a framework relating the political connection of
entrepreneurs and their degree of foreign exposure, this framework captures
two frictions faced by the politically unconnected entrepreneur in an environ-
ment like mainland China: (a) risks of asset expropriation via higher setup
costs, and (b) political misallocation of liquidity via state-owned banks. In
the context of a closed economy, political and economic frictions would gen-
erate inefficient wedges most of the time. In an open regime, however, the
most efficient but politically unconnected agents could look for foreign VCs.
The conceptual framework14 in the flavor of (Baumol, 1990) offers three
14Analytically speaking, one type of financing is abstracted away from my conceptual
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predictions, which will be tested within an empirical framework:
• H-1: The politically connected billionaire entrepreneurs are less likely
to solicit outside funding through state-owned banks and less concerned
about the risk of expropriation.
• H-2: The politically unconnected grassroots billionaires without suffi-
cient degrees of foreign exposures are capable of financing themselves
via self-reliance.
• H-3: The politically unconnected with some degrees of foreign expo-
sures have a higher tendency of being financed by foreign VCs through
an offshore entity to overcome liquidity need and attenuate political
economy frictions.
In the following empirical section, this paper also highlights a key chan-
neling mechanism through which a state-owned enterprise (SOE) restruc-
turing event could play a role for these politically connected billionaire en-
trepreneurs. Indeed, this model is specific to the context within which cre-
ative destruction with Chinese characteristics is situated15.
2.4 An Empirical Implementation
2.4.1 Data
Financing decisions are critically made by entrepreneurs to develop their
companies, especially in an environment of political frictions. Thus far, this
apparatus, i.e., the self-help financing through filial and clan networks from the cultural
perspective (Zingales, 2015).
15In future expositions, a few more assumptions could be relaxed by incorporating more
realistic features such that the banks might not prioritize the politically connected to the
extent that it would dismiss the expected return of a project from an unconnected en-
trepreneur entirely. To this, two remarks are offered. One, as noted by Huang (2008),
the reorientation from small businesses to state-owned enterprises can be understood as
a preferential treatment over liquidity provision, which gives a premium to political con-
nectedness. Two, this could lead to a much more complicated story for future research
by taking into account the dynamic view of the strengthening of enforcement institutions
with economic development.
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paper has proposed a new conceptual framework and outlined its underly-
ing political economy and financing logic. The extent to which the concep-
tual framework can contribute to the explanation of this “China puzzle” on
entrepreneurship and innovation depends on the feasibility of experiments.
Ideally, the experiment would track a large number of entrepreneurs with
different degrees of political connectedness and foreign exposures through
various stages of their companies and link their success as well as failure with
the interconnectedness between their decisions and the institutional context.
However, due to the limitations of the data (such as survival bias), I can only
study the superstar performers, who are self-made billionaire entrepreneurs,
captured by Forbes and Hurun China’s Rich List16.
To construct a database, I build on two billionaire lists: the World’s Bil-
lionaires compiled by Forbes17, Feb. 2017 version, and Hurun’s China Rich
List, 2016 version from which the name of the entrepreneur, his/her com-
pany name, net worth, and industrial information are gathered. Although
these two lists adopt different valuation techniques and thresholds on billion-
aire entrepreneurs, among the top 300 billionaires on the list, the extent of
overlapping constitute more than 75 percentage points. The primary sam-
ple of interest is based on the 317 billionaires from Feb. 2017, Forbes, to
which additional names from Hurun’s top 300 are added as sensitivity check
against the unique selection criteria used by Forbes. Considering the amount
of manual work in constructing this database and fetching information from
various sources, it is assumed such that no systematic coding error exists for
each variable, although individually there could be coding mistakes.
Main Outcome Variables: Financial and Managerial Decisions
Starting from these two lists, I manually construct a database where key
observable financing decisions made by these global billionaire entrepreneurs
16Hurun China Rich List has been compiled by Mr. Rupert Hoogewerft, a British
businessman and publisher. The China Rich List from Hurun Report, is available from
http://www.hurun.net/EN/Article/Details?num=2B1B8F33F9C0. The entry threshold
is considerably lower, at about 2 billion RMB (approximately 300 million USD).
17The World’s Billionaires is an annual ranking by the net worth of the world’s wealth-
iest billionaires by Forbes, an American business magazine. The World’s Billionaires
database, Forbes, can be accessed via https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/.
The entry threshold is a net worth of at least 1 billion US dollars.
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are located as proxies. In doing so, I employ the Orbis database18 to track
down these billionaire entrepreneurs on the two lists. Careful attention is
paid to the choice of listing locations19 and the incidence of an offshore
variable interest entity (VIE) structure20, two major outcomes of interest.
Having coded these two outcome variables, I supplement the database with
detailed official website research on the company associated with billionaire
entrepreneurs on these two lists. From the history page (usually) of each
company linked to the billionaire entrepreneur on the list, I code two dum-
mies to two events: (a) whether or not the company was financed by a foreign
VC21; and (b) whether or not the company was restructured (i.e., privatized)
from a state-owned enterprise (SOE)22. Using the original two lists, I con-
struct a dummy variable regarding entry into TMT sectors, the abbreviation
for the technology, media, and telecom sector, a term used by market par-
ticipants. It is worth noting that foreign financing binary has entered into
foreign exposure measure.
Measures of Social Origins: Political Connections
To understand the social origins of these billionaire entrepreneurs, I mea-
sure political (un)connectedness (i.e., the social origin) of a billionaire en-
trepreneur using different index. To construct measures on political (un)connectedness
from public information, three measurements are constructed: (a) the social
18A global companywide database on financial and ownership information, available
from https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/international/orbis.
19Specifically a dummy variable is constructed for listed companies. For listed compa-
nies, whether it is listed within mainland China or outside is a critical variable for the story.
A listing entity outside mainland China is counted as foreign listing, which includes the
following combinations in my sample: Hong Kong/Shanghai, Hong Kong/Shenzhen, Hong
Kong/Shenzhen/London/Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong/Shenzhen/Singapore, New York
Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange/Shanghai, NASDAQ, Shanghai/Singapore,
and Shenzhen/Hong Kong, Shenzhen/Hong Kong/Australia.
20The possible combinations of offshore entities in my sample include Australia,
Bermuda/Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, Cayman Islands/Hong Kong, Hong Kong only,
Singapore, the Virgin Islands/Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands/Hong Kong.
21This includes financing from overseas Chinese, say an angel investor from Hong Kong.
Only pre-IPO foreign investments would enter into the calculation. Coding these variables
sometimes requires extensive research beyond the company’s website.
22A record of SOE restructuring does not necessarily indicate local capture or corrup-
tion. This is a mistake made by many authors in this field.
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origin/family background23; (b) the occupational experience before founding
his/her own company24; and (c) the first scoop of gold experience25, which
measure at best the root of the business model and reflect the potential type
of an entrepreneur26. It is based on these considerations that I construct
several empirical measures of political (un)connectedness from three factors:
family and social origin, job and occupation, and the root of the business
model (via the first scope of gold). Finally, all three measures are summa-
rized into an aggregate score27.
Measures of Foreign Exposures
To capture the degree of the foreign exposures for each billionaire en-
trepreneur, I searched Orbis database for non-Chinese names on the board
or senior management of the company. A binary measure for being able
to speak English is coded as a way to gauge foreign ties. Another binary
measure captures foreign education binary28. Along with financing of foreign
VCs, the total foreign score is composed of the sum of four binary measures:
oral English, foreign education, the presence of a foreign VC financing event,
and the presence of foreign management (as of 2018).
Control Variables and Others
23Whether or not the entrepreneur is connected with the top circles of political elites
at birth.
24This means the degree to which her prior occupation is related to the state and how
that job link is connected with her own business. Lower tier, peripheral public sectors jobs
are not deemed as “politically connected”.
25In other words, the degree of which the first scoop of gold is made via political
connections. This is a subjective measure based on the author’s reading of the career
history of the billionaire entrepreneur, given available information
26To be clear about my terminology regarding political (un)connectedness the defining
criteria is the extent to which the inherited or acquired ties with respect to the communist
state are perceptively strong. Take Liu Yonghao (profiled in the appendix B.5) as an
example. Before plunging into a chicken farming business with his three brothers, Liu
worked as a public school teacher while his billionaire brother and early partner served
briefly at the county government. Unlike Wang Jianlin (profiled in the appendix B.5) who
served as a manager of a state-owned enterprise before its privatization program, Liu’s
brothers are peasants of a poor locality with no real public authority even though they
might have taken a public job before their entrepreneurship
27Each measure of political connectedness is converted into a measure of unconnected-
ness, with a value of one denoting political unconnectedness, for analytical convenience.
28Degrees, excluding honorary degrees, are counted. Foreign education includes degrees
from Hong Kong and Macau.
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From the company’s official website, I collect information about the found-
ing year, founding headquarter, and the current headquarter at the city level.
A CEO dummy is coded to distinguish the primary leadership of firm (“the
founding CEO”) from other co-founders who share the same company-level
information. A binary variable for female billionaires is constructed. In-
formation about an entrepreneur’s educational achievement is also coded in
three ways: (i) whether or not she has a college education; if so, (ii) whether
or not she has attended an elite college; and (iii) whether she has a foreign
degree. The identification of a communist party organ within the company
is coded to finalize data collection at the firm level29.
Panel A of Table 2.1 summarizes the general information about global bil-
lionaire entrepreneur data from Forbes and Hurun China’s Rich List. Among
317 billionaires from mainland China, about 95% of them is identified (i.e.,
the firm and personal level information are complete); while the missing data
in the expanded dataset is around 9%30. Panel B shows the summary statis-
tics of major variables along with their quartile information. The proportion
of politically connected types from family background, job connections, and
first scope of gold experience are about 6%, 28%, and 17% respectively. For-
eign exposures are relatively low, with an average of 0.24, with a possible
maximum of four. Only 2% of them have foreign degrees if they do have
college degrees at all. 7% of them are co-founders and investors rather than
CEOs of the firm. For about 70% of the firms, this paper reports a party
organ within the firm. About 80 percent of the companies are listed compa-
nies among which the fraction of listing outside mainland China is around
one quarter, a figure similar to the incidence of offshore vehicles. Comparing
the Forbes and the expanded dataset, the difference of measurements across
variables is rather small.
For graphical analysis, Figure 2.3 presents two heatmap diagrams as a way
of visualizing the central message, triangulating social origins, foreign expo-
29The existence of such organs can be found via internet search relating the name of the
company to “party study groups” events. For those companies whose have party organs
within yet conceal their functions for whatever reasons, this method cannot ascertain
either their existence or the reasons for such concealments.
30Appendix Table B.4.7 gives a short definition of the variables.
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sures, and financial decisions. Panel A records the percentage of billionaires
using offshore vehicles. At low values of the politically unconnected index
(i.e., the entrepreneur is politically connected ), increasing foreign exposure
does not necessarily increase the chances of public listing outside mainland
China, because the ability to finance through state-controlled banks can be
generally cheaper than equity financing via foreign VCs. However, the pos-
itive relationship between the foreign element and listing outside will be
strengthened in the case of higher levels of political irrelevance, which means
that only those entrepreneurs who are both politically unconnected and have
sufficient degree of foreign links are capable of obtaining foreign VC supports
(panel B, Figure 2.3).
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The ideal experiment would observe losers, less successful entrepreneurs
(those who are far below the billionaire benchmark), successful entrepreneurs
who deviate slightly from the billionaire benchmark, and those billionaire
entrepreneurs at a particular time point. While acknowledging survivorship
bias, this paper provides a novel approach to study the relationship between
social and political factors regarding the entrepreneurs and the firm-level fi-
nancing structures. For valid testing of the conceptual framework outlined in
the theoretical section, this empirical section discusses the following question:
given the fact that these people are successful billionaire entrepreneurs, how
do their social and political factors affect their observable financing decisions
(e.g., listing and offshore choices) at the firm level?
The main specification follows a probability model as much as possible.
The primary outcome variables focus on the determinants of financing de-
cisions at the firm level (Y Firme,t,c ) made by the billionaire entrepreneur (e) at
the founding year (t) based in founding city (c)31 with respect to various
31For multiple base, the decision is to use the headquarter as the founding base. This
is collected and verified from the website of the company, usually in the history page.
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measures of political unconnectedness (Pe) and foreign element (Fe):
Y Firme,t,c = constant + α[1|Fe ≥ δ
f
threshold] + β[1|Pe ≥ δuthreshold]+
θ[1|Pe ≥ δuthreshold]× [1|Fe ≥ δ
f
threshold] + γXe + µc + ωt + εc̃ (2.1)
Where δuthreshold and δ
f
threshold are selecting parameters governing unconnected
index and foreign exposure index through which the threshold of meeting
sufficient degree of unconnectedness and foreign exposure can be allowed to
vary. The main coefficients of interest are placed on α, an estimate of the ef-
fect of a politically (un)connected entrepreneur on the probability of making
certain financing decisions, and β, which relates the foreign elements of an
entrepreneur to financing decisions. The interaction term θ, fundamental to
the validity of the conceptual framework, captures the effect on firm-level de-
cisions made by those billionaire entrepreneurs who meet both thresholds for
being politically unconnected and foreign exposed. The specification corrects
for potential confounding bias through the specification of error term struc-
tures. Whereas µc captures the founding city fixed effects and ωt controls for
year fixed effects, Xe are other control variables related to the entrepreneur
(e.g., a dummy for a college degree). I cluster the standard errors, εc̃, by the
city of the current (as of 2017) headquarter (c̃, as opposed to c in the fixed
effect) of the company to admit covariance structures within-city levels32.
By taking financing decisions as a function of the social and political ori-
gins of the billionaire entrepreneurs, the empirical strategy can be interpreted
as generalized “difference-in-difference” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003)
with the two threshold parameters serving as a handler for model selection
and sensitivity tests. Since the nature of the question is less placed on causal
analysis, the regression results shall be interpreted as descriptive analysis.
32Unlike the empirical papers on leadership and growth (Jones and Olken, 2005), my
dataset on billionaires consists of co-founders, investors, and minor shareholders, who be-
came global billionaires as the company grows larger. Other than variations in social
origins, the co-founders share the same company level characteristics as that of the en-
trepreneur. To address this concern and focus on the “primary founder”, two alternative
strategies are considered: (i) remove cofounders and concentrate only on the founding
CEOs; (ii) using billionaire net worth as analytical weights in regressions, the results of
which are reported in Appendix tables.
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This paper now proceeds with its core empirical investigation in four
steps. First, it documents the strong association between foreign exposure
and financing decisions. Second, it traces the widespread use of offshore ve-
hicles and the action of public listing outside mainland China, which goes
back to the social origins and foreign exposures of billionaire entrepreneurs.
Third, it links the politically unconnected billionaire entrepreneurs with a
certain degree of foreign exposures to entry into the innovative sectors and
those that are politically connected with an incidence of state-owned enter-
prise restructuring. Finally, billionaire entrepreneurs are empirically assigned
into categories to test my conceptual framework.
2.4.3 The Foreign Roots of Financing Decisions
In this section, this paper relates the degree of a foreign element of a
billionaire entrepreneur to two observable financing decisions - using offshore
vehicles and listing outside mainland China. This step aims to get an esti-
mate of α, aside from political and social origins of the entrepreneur. The
results of estimating various versions of equation (2.1) based on threshold
measures and samples are reported in Table 2.2. Increasing the threshold
level, the linear probability model finds that foreign exposure increases us-
age of offshore vehicles by 50 to 60 percent (panel A, column 1-3) using three
different thresholds. Regarding listing outside mainland China, foreign ex-
posures increase the odds ratio by around 5.6 to 8.9 (panel B, column 1-2)
based on the thresholds. Notice that using a high cutoff value δf destabilizes
the logit model (panel B, column 3). In both models, using offshore vehicles
and listing outside mainland China are two decisions strongly associated with
foreign exposures. Note that using the raw foreign exposure index decreases
the effects as a result of an increase in range (column 4). In both cases,
additional estimates of standard errors are provided. For the linear model,
the results are robust to Huber-White robust standard errors in the bracket;
the logistic models are, on the other hand, robust to a multi-cluster method
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) when both current and first headquarters
are used.
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Additional billionaire entrepreneurs from Hurun 300 are added to the ex-
isting sample to address the concerns over Forbes’ selecting criteria. The
results of the whole sample (column 5) and the CEO sample (column 6) hold
up. Another concern is that the existence of party organ within the firms
might have diluted the relationship between foreign exposure and financing
decisions. Column 7 considers the key empirical specification over the sample
of firms that have identified with party organs, showing similar strong rela-
tionships. When foreign exposure is represented by financing from foreign
VCs, the probability of using an offshore entity increases by 60 percentage
points (pp) (column 8). In unreported specifications, English speaking and
foreign education are weak predictors of using offshore vehicles, whereby the
existence of foreign management increases the chance of identification of an
offshore entity by around 20 percentage points (pp). Table B.4.2 in the Ap-
pendix, to address concerns about unweighted linear estimates, reports that
when stringent threshold of δf is dropped in the logit model, the relationship
between foreign exposure and these two financing decisions remains valid af-
ter using billionaire net worths as weights33 for all other than one (column 3).
Graphical evidence in the Appendix Figure B.3.1 also supports this finding.
Taking stock, this section establishes the empirical foundation that those
billionaire entrepreneurs using offshore financing vehicles and listing outside
mainland China share common attributes associated with foreign elements,
partly confirming the H-3 hypothesis.
2.4.4 The Socio-Political Origins of Financing Deci-
sions: An Interacted Effect
How do foreign elements triangulate with both social and political ori-
gins of the billionaire entrepreneurs and certain kinds of financing decisions?
To tackle this question, I took two steps: (a) first by proving that being
politically unconnected does not increase the probability of using offshore fi-
33The literature cautions overusing weights given the fact that nonlinear CEFs and
unknown structures for heteroskedasticity might confound weighting parameters (Deaton,
1997; Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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nancing vehicles and listing outside the country; and (b) demonstrating that
the source of variability is mostly driven by the interaction between measures
of political unconnectedness and that of foreign indexes.
Graphical evidence of mixed entrepreneurship is presented in Figure 2.4,
which reports the relationship between political unconnectedness index (based
on some thresholds δu) and three key financing decisions: the use of offshore
vehicles, domestic listing, and offshore listing. Among all threshold values,
the coefficients on political unconnectedness dummy remain insignificant,
indicative of the existence of mixed entrepreneurship within the group of
politically unconnected billionaires. This fact is further supported in Ap-
pendix Table B.4.2, which gives the results of a number of logistic models
for each particular unconnectedness measure, reveals that coefficients cannot
reject the nonzero hypothesis. In other words, the financing behaviors among
the politically unconnected grassroots entrepreneurs are pooled concerning
choices between outward development strategy and using the burgeoning
domestic capital market, unless the level of foreign exposures is taken into
account.
Interacting the measures of the foreign index with the social and political
factors of the entrepreneurs, Table 2.3 reports the core results of this paper,
the interacted effects on financing outcomes, taking an agnostic approach to
varying cutoff measures of δf and δu. Results in Panel A suggests that tight-
ening by δf = 3 (column 3) makes the estimating framework meaningless
given the problem of multicollinearity. My preferred choice of δf = 2 gives
a strong positive effect on both using offshore vehicles (panel A) and listing
outside (panel B). The fact that the billionaire entrepreneurs pass a certain
threshold of political unconnectednsss and foreign element generates at least
80 pp on the outcome of interest gives support to the proposed framework.
However, it is worth noting that raising the bar δu = 3 destabilizes the out-
come. This indicates that the optimal threshold might be (δf = 2, δu = 2).
The sizable impact might be driven by a few superstars firm, and billion-
aires34.
Once I fix δf = 2 and re-estimate equation (2.1) on an expanded dataset,
34See discussion on the share of type of billionaires.
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δu = 2 (row 2) renders an estimate of a range between 56 to 66 pp (column 5-
6). The event dummy for foreign financing from VCs gives an estimate of 56
(79) pp with δu = 2 (1). Interestingly, the subsample with identifiable party
organs turns out some surprising results: either 1) an imprecise estimate or
2) hard-to-interpret outcomes via the interacted term being dropped35.
There is a similar pattern for the probability of listing outside the country
(panel B, column 2, 5-6). For the logit specifications, a method of multiway
clustering proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) is provided to ensure the ro-
bustness of standard errors. The interaction effects from logit models suggest
large positively significant results36. The fact that party estimates are impre-
cise might be a result of multicollinearity problem or the absorbing effects
of fixed effects. I investigated this in appendix table B.4.4: removing the
multicollinearity term turns out expected estimates of the interaction effects.
In the expanded dataset, the estimate (Panel B, Row 2, and Column 6) for
CEO subsample is a bit smaller. The interacted effects strongly validate the
conceptual framework when the foreign measure is replaced by a financing
event from foreign VCs (column 8).
Except for foreign VCs financing the grassroots entrepreneurs, other met-
rics of foreign exposure are not as good as financing events by foreign VCs
in explaining degrees of variations (Appendix Table B.4.5). Median regres-
sions for count data are tested using the method suggested by Machado and
Silva (2005)37. Another glance at the strength of correlation could be identi-
35This might seems to suggest that those firms with an observable party organ and
those without might have some qualitative difference where a theory of role of party
organizations in innovative firms is needed. Further work is needed to understand the
rules on setting up party organs within big private or foreign organization in mainland
China and their impacts on firm policies. The section on sensitivity will come back on
this question.
36An inspection shows that the measure of the foreign element might be highly collinear
with the interacted term, leaving a largely unstable estimate. In some (unreported) speci-
fications, the fact that foreign index tends to have a collinear behavior with its interaction
with the unconnected index leads to less visually robust results when threshold criteria
are applied with fixed effects included.
37Using δf = 2 and δu = 2, my preferred coefficients (standard deviation), β̂(σ̂β), θ̂(σ̂θ),
under quantile (q = 0.5) regression for count data (Controls are female, college degree,
and a constant) are: 0.36 (49.26), 1.68 (0.23) for using offshore vehicles; 0.12(1.88), 1.24
(0.28) for listing outside. The interaction term is robust as well as significant to q = 0.35
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fied when the raw scores for foreign exposure and political unconnectedness
measures are considered as factor variables with continuous interactions (Ap-
pendix Figure B.3.3): in addition to those with foreign score as a value of
zero, the increase in the degree of political unconnectedness increases the
probability of predicting the use of offshore vehicles (panel A) and listing
outside the country (panel B)38.
In short, the result in this section provides factual foundations for hy-
pothesis H-3. I now investigate the behaviors of other kinds of billionaire
entrepreneurs.
2.4.5 Potential Mechanisms Through Revealed Choices
In addition to decisions over the public listing and using offshore vehi-
cles, billionaire entrepreneurs revealed other observable decisions along their
path to success. In this section, I investigate two potential outcomes and
relate them to plausible mechanisms. In this margin of variation, this pa-
per provides evidence of the linkage between foreign exposures on entering
into innovative (TMT) sectors and historical records of state-owned enter-
prise (SOE) restructuring. Higher probability of entries into TMT sectors
is governed by outer regions of the Political Unconnected Index × Foreign
Exposure Index space (panel A, Appendix Figure B.3.4). In contrast, panel
B finds that a dense region is associated with SOE restructuring records
of those billionaire entrepreneurs who fail to meet the criteria of both the
foreign exposure and political unconnectedness.
In lines with the conceptual framework, Table 2.4 uses variants of equation
(2.1) to investigate the effect on TMT and SOE outcomes through the inter-
acted impact from foreign and political unconnected measures. In panel A, I
find that when the billionaire entrepreneur has a higher degree of the foreign
score, the likelihood of venturing into the TMT sector increases. A some-
what puzzling finding is that entry into TMT is mostly driven by those with
or 0.75.
38In other words, high foreign score combined with the high index of political uncon-
nectedness predicts a higher probability of the presence of offshore vehicles underlying the
billionaire entrepreneurs’ company.
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a high foreign score and some measure of political connectedness (i.e., the
interacted effects). In fact, this surprise makes sense. Statistically speaking
(see next section), given the fact that a large number of unconnected billion-
aires are self-made from no initial support from the state or foreign VC, here
is no strong link between unconnected billionaires and TMT entry, as a mea-
sure of innovation. When measuring foreign link is switched to VC financing
events, the estimated coefficients support the conceptual framework (column
3-4, panel A)39. By contrast, a high politically unconnectedness score tends
to decrease the likelihood of SOE restructuring (column 1-4, panel B). Party
subsample still imposes multicollinearity problems (column 7). Appendix
Figure B.3.1 and B.3.2 provide graphical evidence of the impact on outcomes
of political unconnectedness and foreign element using different level mea-
sures: while the degree of political unconnectedness predicts unlikely SOE
restructuring events, level of foreign elements have no predictive power over
both TMT entry and SOE events.
In conclusion, the result in this section provides factual foundations for
hypothesis H-1 and H-3, revealing that the politically connected and the
strongly foreign-exposed are two different categories. This leaves the re-
maining kind forming the core of politically unconnected and weakly foreign
related kind and its behaviors under hypothesis H-2. The following simple
test is a direct check of the validity of conceptual framework.
2.4.6 A Simple Test on the Conceptual Framework
How does the empirical outlook relate to the proposed conceptual frame-
work? In this section, I use a technical rule by setting (δf , δu) = (2, 2) to
assign each billionaire entrepreneur to their empirically revealed categories40.
39Conditional on getting foreign VC, the ratio of entering into TMT is 21:11. For those
without foreign VC, the ratio is 103:241 on the augmented sample.
40Two caveats have to be made: (a) the ideal type to which a billionaire entrepreneur
belongs should not be taken as a fixed attribute for the person. Examples of degenerations
and alienations are plenty. For example, Huang Guangyu of a peasant origin without a
college degree, was a self-made billionaire through the founding of Gome Electrical Ap-
pliance, a Hong Kong-listed company, as early as in 1987, becoming one of the largest
electrical appliance retailers across the country. His downfall, however, was triggered by
charges related to manipulation of stock prices and briberies to officials after being three
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First, a connected billionaire entrepreneur (type I), as is designated, meets
the criteria that his or her unconnectedness score falls beyond a cutoff of one
out of a maximum of three. Second, among the unassigned entrepreneurs, a
billionaire of foreign elements (type II) is defined to have equal or higher than
two in the aggregate measure of the foreign exposures or having a foreign cap-
ital injection before IPO. Finally, exceptions are made to three billionaires
(about 1% of the Forbes and expanded Hurun sample), who, although being
able to speak English with foreign university degrees, behave very much like
the indigenous type (type III), as evidenced by a domestic listing of their
companies associated with no observable offshore entities.
Compared with the politically connected type, billionaires with high for-
eign scores are more than 90% more likely to use offshore financing vehicles
and list outside mainland China (panel A, column 1 and 2, Table 2.5)41.
Unlike billionaires with high foreign scores, connected firms and self-made
grassroots tend to list domestically (column 3) or remain private (column
4). As opposed to two categories without foreign exposure, TMT entries
are significantly higher than the foreign connected type (column 7-8). This
outlook further contrasts with the connected entrepreneurs, who had around
30 pp higher likelihood of an SOE record (column 5-6).
Through close inspection, these pattern reveal the geographical features
of innovation with Chinese characteristics. The top five cities measured by
entries into TMT sector where the innovation-driven entrepreneurs choose to
base their companies (percentage of total TMT related entrepreneurs), are
Shenzhen (17.74%), Beijing (16.94%), Hangzhou (9.68%), Shanghai (8.06%),
times the richest man of China, recorded by Hurun’s Rich List. For the applicability of
the framework, a conceptual distinction would require a separation of Huang’s early part,
en route to a global billionaire status from his later stages of living as a global billion-
aire. By focusing on the process of value-creation as his founding company experienced
tremendous growth, Huang Guangyu is empirically assigned to type III in the enlarged
database because no foreign venture financing was found before his IPO. (b) Even among
connected types, the degree to which political connections have been used to fuel individ-
ual success and how that degree is crossing the line of legality should best be treated with
a continuous level. However, by categorizing billionaires into three broad categories, this
paper allows variations within each type, knowing that measuring human relationship can
be quite malleable.
41Given the consistency and stability of these standard deviation estimators, Huber-
White and Cameron et al. (2011) type of estimators are not reported.
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and Guangzhou (3.23%). The top three cities, where an SOE restructur-
ing event is associated with a billionaire entrepreneur, are Ningbo (8.62%),
Foshan (5.17%), and Shanghai (5.17%). In short, while innovation-driven
entrepreneurs are congregated in big cities (e.g., hubs), billionaires who have
SOE-structuring events are much more likely to be distributed across the
country, especially in lower-tier cities.
Who are the billionaire entrepreneurs of the pernicious kind, the products
of crony capitalist regimes, as many authors would argue? Three comments
are made to this question. First, the proposed framework empirically relate
the (potential) existence of bad entrepreneurs to records of SOE restruc-
turing, a process of which is prone to local capture, authority leakage, and
corruption. Second, I briefly discuss two kinds of state-owned restructur-
ing in my sample: an efficient improving exit scheme arranged by the local
governments through an agreed management buyout (MBO) and a perni-
cious state-asset expropriation via insiders and local business and government
elites42. Third, among the unidentified billionaire entrepreneurs (about 5%,
16 out 317 in total), a detailed case profiling shows the difficulties when
the problems of unclear career histories kick in along the wealth accumula-
tion path. It is these billionaire entrepreneurs that defy simple groupings of
the proposed conceptual and necessitate a case by case research when new
information is available in the future.
Simple as my framework might be, it offers a bird eye’s view of the space
of global billionaire entrepreneurs: the connected billionaires are products
42Let me provide two examples regarding two typical cases of SOE restructuring: (i)
Pang Kang (Forbes 2017, net worth: USD 3.8B.), a Guangdong local, joined the state-
owned soy sauce factory immediately after college. He moved through the ranks and
files in the state-owned factory from a line manager into the chairman of the company
before privatization through an MBO deal. He led the company to become the largest
manufacturer of soy sauce in the world and went through an IPO in the Shanghai Stock
Exchange; (ii) Wang Wenliang (Forbes 2017, net worth: USD 1.2B.) is a classic example
of billionaire entrepreneurs who masterfully colluded with key party officials. He bribed
the (then) party secretary of Dandong (later put on trial and as of 2018 was serving his
sentence) who helped him capture a majority stake in Dadong Port Group, near North
Korea, at below the market prices. Stiglitz (1996) on privatization as an illustrative point
is applicable to my context, “The problem is the difficulty of distinguishing between those
rents that are necessary to promote economic efficiency and those rents that are the reward
to unproductive rent-seeking activities within the political process”.
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of the combination of their rent-seeking activities and real value creations
with vast degrees of variations even among themselves, at times crossing the
boundaries; the self financiers and supporters are grassroots from lower strata
of the society without both foreign venture capitalists and the state to rely
on, particularly during their formative periods; and finally the ones who are
open to the outside world with a strong willingness to become part of the
global business elites are tightly integrated into the global capital market on
the shoulders of foreign VCs. As a result of this exercise, among those global
billionaire entrepreneurs (317 in total) recorded by Forbes, Feb. 2017, the
share of type I, II, and III billionaire entrepreneurs are 20.25%, 7.28%, and
72.78% respectively by subsuming all the unidentified billionaires into the
connected category (Type I), consistent with hypothesis H1 to H3.
2.4.7 Sensitivity Tests
This section addresses a number of sensitivity tests and robustness issues
associated with the main empirical results. It focuses on three concerns: (i)
The validity of empirically constructed types; (ii) the role of party organs
and the necessity for a theoretical understanding; (iii) the impact of age
structure and issues of comparability; and (iv) the issue of randomness in
the data generating process.
Does empirically constructed type of entrepreneurs provide
valid conceptual categories?—A test of equality of distributions among
different kinds of entrepreneurs.
Concerns over conceptual validity of entrepreneurial types are dealt with
in Table 2.6 through Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Decisions to use offshore
vehicles and listing outside mainland China constitute the major distinction
between unconnected billionaires with foreign elements (type II) and other
two, a demarcation that extends into TMT entries and founding headquar-
ters. The type of politically connected billionaire entrepreneurs is impugned
by a higher probability of SOE restructuring as opposed to the other two cat-
egories. However, the presence of party organs does not differ across types,
conceptually and statistically.
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What is the role party organ—The role of party organ in private
and foreign-owned Chinese firms.
According to the organization rule of CPC concerning grassroots organi-
zations43, it is not surprising to find that a company founded by the global
billionaire entrepreneur set up a party organ. Does the presence of a party
organ affect firm policies? Table 2.7 reports some preliminary findings of this
question: the presence of party organ has a poor explanatory power regard-
ing firm policies. This merits future research on the functioning impact of
party organ within firms, especially the relationship with labor unions (Yao
and Zhong, 2013).
Does age structure affect comparability of billionaire entrepreneurs?
—The role of generational difference.
To check the sensitity against this concern, I re-estimate the preferred
specification using different subsamples based on the founding year of the
company. Figure 2.8 shows that the main estimates are fairly reliable to
these concerns about age structure and generational comparability. It shall
be noted that in unreported regressions the multicollinearity issue between
foreign measure and the interaction term becomes severe as sample size
shrinks44.
How is the empirical outcome driven by pure chance? —A
Placebo and Randomization Test.
One primary concern is that the reported relationship identified as a
mapping from social and political factors of a billionaire entrepreneur to
his/her financing decisions is entirely driven by random chance, if not noise
in measurements or a biased estimate in standard errors (Bertrand et al.,
2004). This paper implements a nonparametric permutation strategy testing
the effect from interaction term, θ = 0, for the Forbes data, to deal with
43The document I am referring to is the Working Regulation on Grassroots Organs
related to CPC and State[zhongguo gongchandang danghejiguan jicengzuzhi gongzuotiaoli],
which was initially implemented in 1998 and has been updated in 2010 (the latest version,
as of 2018). This document designates three cutoffs for setting up a party organ (> 3 party
member), branches (> 50 party member), and committees (> 100). The strict boundary
can be relaxed depending on working needs.
44I stop at the year 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Talk (ST) with future
research (Xiao, 2019b).
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this concern. The “placebo” effect consists of a permutation of offshore de-
cisions. After that, this paper re-estimates (2.1), and take the “placebo”
offshore outcome as the actual observation. F (θ̂) is defined to be the em-
pirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of the placebo effects, the
statistic 1−F (θ∗) gives a nonparametric p-value for the null hypothesis θ = 0
when the realized value is θ∗. The idea is that if the effect generated by the
actual data is significant (θ = 0.96, from column 2 and row 2, Table 3),
then it should be positioned at the high-tail of the ECDF. Because of the
nature of a nonparametric test, it does not suffer over-rejection of t-statistics
as a result of measurement error. Figure 2.9 illustrates the outcomes from
the permutation tests by plotting the ECDF of θ for using offshore vehicles,
using 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 permutations. The vertical line
denotes the actual interaction effect reported in column 2 and row 2, Table 3.
The empirical p-values (1 − F (θ)) from these permutations of different size
are 0.002 (1,000 permutations), 0.001 (2,000 permutations), 0.0006 (5,000
permutations), 0.0006 (10,000 permutations), and 0.0008 (20,000 permuta-
tions).
Implications: A Comment
My empirical analysis under the guidance of a conceptual framework em-
phasizes the importance of taking foreign financing access channel into serious
consideration. Indeed, politically driven billionaire entrepreneurs are likely to
take advantage of the opportunity of SOE restructuring as a way of capital-
izing on their connections. The results put forth here suggests these tend to
be under one out of every five. In short, studies so far either over-emphasizes
the crony capitalist elements or failed to take the role of foreign financing
channel seriously. In other words, the emphasis, however, should not only
be placed on the mere existence of bad entrepreneurs with a limited under-
standing of their behaviors, but also on their coexistence with good types, in
which interlinkage with foreign investors can be used as a dividing line for
the analytical purpose of a conceptual apparatus. It is this coexistence of
good and bad entrepreneurs that supports to my conceptual framework.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper has documented the growth of the number of global billion-
aire entrepreneurs from mainland China over recent years. Using a politico-
economic framework, I have proposed a few measures to understand the
interacted impact of political connection and foreign elements. In doing so,
this is the first paper to link observed financial structures to human factors
in an empirical assessment of billionaire entrepreneurs from mainland China.
There are two key findings: (a) the role of foreign financing channeling cannot
be ignored, and (b) the evidence shows that in addition to the politically con-
nected rent-seeking billionaires, the existence of entrepreneurial billionaires
cannot also be ignored. These findings might be surprising but rationalizable
within a suitable framework.
In addition, this research shows that entrepreneurs who use offshore ve-
hicles45 could partially circumvent some of the obstacles imposed through
inefficient institutions. The conclusion and results of this paper may in-
clude three different areas of future research. First, this paper proposes the
need to understand the financial decisions by entrepreneurs in a financially
underdeveloped environment. Second, in the context of the literature on
globalization, this paper provides evidence that financial market imperfec-
tions might be partially offset by ingenious choices made by entrepreneurs
within given policy framework. Future research might explore how linkages
between financially developed and underdeveloped countries could open up
new space for global innovation. Finally, in the context of the political econ-
omy of development, this paper suggests a potential role for a developmental
state in shaping the course of financial development. The degree of success
or disaster of these state-led policies in promoting entrepreneurship could be
explored in the future.
45I do not, however, claim this channel, albeit an important one, to be the only one
channel underlying the increase in the number billionaire entrepreneurs from China. Fu-
ture work can explore other channels and mechanism as heterogeneous responses under
inefficient institutions.
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Figure 2.1: Evolutions of Numbers of Global Billionaires: Mainland China
versus the United States, 2003-2018
Notes: Global billionaires is defined as a person exceeding a net worth of 1 billionaire US
dollars for that year. Data: the World’s Billionaire Database, Forbes.
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Figure 2.2: Geographical Distributions of Billionaires from Mainland China
Notes: Global billionaires is defined as a person exceeding a net worth of 1 billionaire US
dollars for that year. Data: the World’s Billionaire Database, Forbes.
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Figure 2.3: A Heat Map Representation: Social Origins, Foreign Exposures,
and Financial Decisions
Panel A: Public Listing outside Mainland
Panel B: Using Offshore Vehicles
Note: Foreign exposure and political unconnectedness are two aggregate measures, summed
up from the Author’s database. The dependent variables are observable financing decisions:
listing outside mainland China and using offshore vehicles.
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Figure 2.4: Evidence of Mixed Entrepreneurship: Political Unconnectedness
and Financing Decisions
Panel A: Threshold Value δu = 1 Panel B: Threshold Value δu = 2
Panel C: Threshold Value δu = 3
Source: Author’s database. Estimated Coefficients and 95% CI on Forbes sample. In
addition to the three reported coefficient, the linear probability model controls a constant,
cofounding year and headquarter fixed effects.
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Figure 2.5: Geography of Entry into TMT
Panel A: Share Across the Nation
Panel B: Share Within the Province
Note: this figure provides geographical distribution of entry into TMT sectors. Panel A
plots the nationwide share of billionaires entering into TMT sector. Panel B plots the
fraction of billionaires entering into TMT sector for a given province. For provinces with
fewer billionaires, the latter measure can be imprecise.
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Figure 2.6: Geography of SOE Restructuring
Panel A: Share Across the Nation Panel B: Share Within the Province
Note: this figure provides geographical distribution of SOE restructuring. Panel A plots
the nationwide share of billionaires with SOE restructuring experience. Panel B plots
the fraction of billionaires with SOE restructuring experience for a given province. For
provinces with fewer billionaires, the latter measure can be imprecise.
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Figure 2.7: Geography of Using Foreign VCs
Panel A: Share Across the Nation
Panel B: Share Within the
Province
Note: this figure provides geographical distribution of using foreign VCs. Panel A plots the
nationwide share of billionaires with foreign VCs. Panel B plots the fraction of billionaires
entering with foreign VCs for a given province. For provinces with fewer billionaires, the
latter measure can be imprecise.
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Figure 2.8: Age Structure and Subsample Estimation
Panel A: Using Offshore Vehicles
Panel B: Public Listing outside Mainland
Note: These two graphs present estimated interacted coefficients from a linear probability
model by setting (δf , δu) = (2, 2). Each line represents one regression controlling FE and
binaries for female and college degree. Each year presents founding year of company.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of Placebo Estimates: Using Offshore Vehicles
Notes: This figure plots the empirical distribution effects (F) for using offshore vehicles.
The empirical CDF is constructed from 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 20,000 estimates
of θ by setting (δf , δu) = (2, 2) using specification from column 2 and row 2 of Table 3
from permutations of observed offshore vehicles. The vertical line shows the estimated
interaction term reported in that cell. Dataset: Forbes.
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Table 2.1: Variables and Summary Statistics for Global Billionaires from
Mainland China
Panel A: Database Information: Forbes (Augmented by Hurun Top 300)
Total number of billionaire entrepreneurs: 317 (413)
Identified Billionaire Entrepreneurs: Forbes (Augmented by Hurun Top 300): 301(376)
Percentage of Unidentified Billionaire Entrepreneurs: Forbes (Plus Hurun Top 300): 5.04%
(8.96%)
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Forbes (Plus Hurun Top 300).









Family (un)connectedness (0-1) 0.94 (0.94) 0.24 (0.24) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Job (un)connectedness (0-1) 0.72 (0.73) 0.45 (0.45) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1)
First scoop of gold (0-1) 0.83 (0.83) 0.38 (0.38) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Unconnectedness index (0-3) 2.49 (2.50) 0.82 (0.83) 2 (2) 3 (3) 3 (3)
English speaking (0-1) 0.05 (0.06) 0.22 (0.24) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Foreign education (0-1) 0.02 (0.03) 0.15 (0.18) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Foreign financing (0-1) 0.08 (0.09) 0.28 (0.28) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Foreign management (0-1) 0.09 (0.07) 0.28 (0.26) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Foreign exposure index (0-4) 0.24 (0.26) 0.69 (0.72) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
College education (0-1) 0.53 (0.54) 0.50 (0.50) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Elite college (0-1) 0.27 (0.30) 0.44 (0.46) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)
CEO (0-1) 0.93 (0.93) 0.26 (0.26) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
female (0-1) 0.06 (0.06) 0.24 (0.24) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Listing (0-1) 0.79 (0.76) 0.41 (0.43) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Foreign listing (0-1) 0.25 (0.26) 0.44 (0.44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)
SOE restructuring (0-1) 0.16 (0.15) 0.37 (0.36) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Offshore vehicle (0-1) 0.26 (0.26) 0.44 (0.44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)
Party organ (0-1) 0.69 (0.64) 0.46 (0.48) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1)
TMT sector entry (0-1) 0.36 (0.33) 0.48 (0.47) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)
Data source: Forbes’ the World’s Billionaire List, Feb. 2017 version. Hurun’s China Rich
List, 2016 version.
Notes: Although these two lists are based on different valuation techniques, the variations
among top 300 billionaires are quite small. Measures of political connection are converted
into unconnectedness index where a value of one is coded for not having strong political
ties.
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Table 2.2: The Impact of Foreign Element on Offshore Financing and Outside
Listing
Sample Forbes (n:301) Hurun’s Expanded Sample (n:375)
All All CEO Party All
Cutoffa
δfthreshold
1 2 3 Raw
Score
2 2 2 Foreign VC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Linear Probability Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Offshore=1
Foreign Index 0.52 0.58 0.64 0.28 0.44 0.35 0.64 0.60
(0.08) (0.13) (0.21) (0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13)
[0.08] [0.17] [0.18] [0.06] [0.14] [0.17] [0.21] [0.12]
Controlsb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 375 347 240 375
Adj. R2 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.18
Panel B. Logistic Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Foreign Listing=1
Foreign Index 1.73 3.81 0.00c 2.19 3.33 2.81 6.40 3.79
(0.42) (0.94) (.) (0.29) (0.97) (0.77) (2.78) (1.17)
[0.42] [0.87] [.] [0.40] [0.93] [0.71] [2.80] [1.16]
Controlsb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 156 145 156 215 194 106 215
Count R2 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.74
Adj Count R2 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.05 0.30 0.25 0.36 0.26
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of impact of foreign exposures on the probability of using
offshore vehicles and listing outside mainland China using variants of equation (2.1). Column 1-3 uses
different values of the cutoff to generate the binary measure of foreign element. Column 4 represents the
effect of the foreign index score. Fixing the threshold cutoff at 2, column 5-7 use the augmented Hurun
data, CEO subsample, and Party organ subsample respectively. Column (8) considers only foreign VC
financed event as a measure of exposure. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level
of current headquarters (city level). For panel A, the Huber-White robust standard errors are reported
in brackets. For panel B, a method suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is reported in the bracket using
both current and first headquarters as multiway clusters.
a The numbers (percentage) of billionaires selected given threshold values (1-3) are 41(13.6%), 24
(8.0%), and 5 (1.7%) for Forbes sample respectively.
b Controls are binaries for female and college degree.
c Dropped from estimation.
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Table 2.3: The Interacted Effect of Foreign Elements and Social Origin on
Financing Decisions
Sample Forbes (n:301) Hurun’s Expanded Sample (n:375)
All All CEO Party All
δf 1 2 3 Sum Index 2 2 2 Foreign VC
δU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Linear Probability Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Offshore=1
1
0.87 0.80 0.00a 0.40 0.63 0.54 0.00a 0.79
(0.31) (0.39) (.) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (.) (0.31)
[0.38] [0.42] [.] [0.20] [0.37] [0.40] [.] [0.36]
2
-0.03 0.96 0.00a 0.07 0.66 0.56 0.00a 0.56
(0.72) (0.26) (.) (0.47) (0.20) (0.24) (.) (0.31)
[0.51] [0.26] [.] [0.37] [0.25] [0.28] [.] [0.33]
3
0.33 0.77 0.00a 0.21 0.55 0.48 0.74 0.18
(0.50) (0.45) (.) (0.22) (0.34) (0.39) (0.55) (0.22)
[0.32] [0.37] [.] [0.17] [0.34] [0.35] [0.45] [0.32]
Sum Index
0.15 0.41 0.00a 0.10 0.29 0.25 0.73 0.18
(0.28) (0.12) (.) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.56) (0.09)
[0.17] [0.12] [.] [0.08] [0.12] [0.13] [0.46] [0.13]
Panel B. Logistic Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Foreign Listing=1
1
18.48 18.76 0.00a 10.06 17.90 16.16 0.00a 19.07
(3.02) (3.04) (.) (1.44) (2.40) (3.20) (.) (2.45)
[3.55] [3.42] [.] [1.69] [2.44] [3.35] [.] [2.38]
2
-0.35 17.83 0.00a 1.30 17.10 15.98 0.00a 4.68
(5.66) (2.90) (.) (2.63) (1.95) (2.61) (.) (1.94)
[5.86] [3.10] [.] [2.77] [2.05] [2.80] [.] [1.93]
3
1.99 6.48 0.00a 2.22 2.73 1.79 0.00a 3.99
(3.39) (3.79) (.) (1.85) (1.88) (1.92) (.) (2.17)
[3.48] [3.86] [.] [1.92] ([.89] [1.91] [.] [2.23]
Sum Index
1.05 5.19 0.00a 1.09 2.09 1.57 82.59 2.46
(1.88) (2.98) (.) (0.84) (1.16) (1.01) (3.84) (1.31)
[1.96] [3.01] [.] [0.88] [1.17] [1.04] [.] [1.33]
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of the interacted impact of foreign exposures and political
unconnectedness on the probability of using offshore vehicles and listing outside mainland China using
variants of equation (2.1). Each cell presents the estimated interacted effect from one regression. All
specifications contain controls and FE. Column 1-3 uses different values of the cutoff to generate the
binary measure of foreign element. Column 4 represents the effect of the foreign index score. Fixing
the threshold cutoff at 2, column 5-7 use the augmented Hurun data, CEO subsample, and Party organ
subsample respectively. Column (8) considers only foreign VC financed event as a measure of exposure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters (city level).
For panel A, the Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in brackets. For panel B, a method
suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is reported in the bracket using both current and first headquarters
as multiway clusters.
a Dropped by estimation
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Table 2.4: Potential Mechanisms
Sample Forbes Hurun’s Expanded Sample











2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Job Tie
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : TMT=1
Political Index 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.16 -0.00 0.00
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.09] [0.09] [0.15] [0.08]
Foreign Index 0.04 0.81 0.20 0.64 0.86 0.85 0.22 0.47
(0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.30)
[0.19] [0.23] [0.15] [0.28] [0.09] [0.09] [0.15] [0.32]
Foreign× Un-
political
-0.84 -0.50 -0.78 -0.86 0.00a -0.27
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (.) (0.29)
[0.31] [0.33] [0.25] [0.28] [.] [0.36]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 375 347 240 375
Adj. R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.20
Panel B. Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : SOE=1
Political Index -0.34 -0.35 -0.33 -0.33 -0.31 -0.33 -0.44 -0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.09)
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.08] [0.09] [0.12] [0.07]
Foreign Index 0.03 -0.25 0.08 0.05 -0.26 -0.26 0.10 0.19
(0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.33) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.31)
[0.06] [0.11] [0.07] [0.32] [0.10] [0.11] [0.08] [0.31]
Foreign× Un-
political
0.30 0.03 0.32 0.34 0.00a -0.11
(0.17) (0.33) (0.14) (0.15) (.) (0.32)
[0.12] [0.32] [0.11] [0.12] [.] [0.31]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 375 347 240 375
Adj. R2 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.63 0.43
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact on entry into innovative sectors (TMT) and record of
SOE restructuring using variants of equation (2.1) via linear probability model. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters (city level). The Huber-White robust
standard errors are reported in brackets. The threshold method is implemented unless a specific measure
is used. Controls are binaries for female and college degree.
a Dropped by estimation
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Table 2.5: Relating Empirics to the Conceptual Framework
Sample Forbes (n:301) Hurun’s Expanded Sample (n:375)





Listing SOE SOE TMT TMT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Linear Probability Model:
1|Type I 0.64 -0.29 -0.37 -0.33
(0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
1|Type II 0.95 0.93 -0.24 -0.34
(0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.21)
1|Type III 0.05 0.03 0.73 -0.17 -0.30 -0.43 -0.26 -0.21
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 301 301 301 301 375 240 375 347
Adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.50 0.63 0.20 0.15
Panel B. Logit Model:
1|Type I -34.64 -37.75 16.16 -2.10 -1.89
(1.66) (3.91) (2.17) (0.83) (0.87)
1|Type II 0.00a 45.50 0.00a
(.) (2.25) (.)
1|Type III -34.33 -37.71 0.55 0.98 12.00 -1.40 -1.16
(1.13) (3.83) (0.53) (0.69) (2.36) (0.42) (0.44)
Observations 146 156 160 133 131 30 196 172
Count R2 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.71 0.91 0.80 0.69 0.70
Adj. Count R2 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.17 0.40 0.27 0.25
Notes: This table reports estimates of the difference by entrepreneur type on outcomes using variants of
equation (2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters
(city level). All specifications include year and first headquarter fixed effects.
a Dropped by estimation
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Table 2.6: Comparison Across Different Types of Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III vs. I III vs. II II vs. I III vs. I III vs. II II vs. I
Sample: Forbes Hurun’s Expanded Sample
Offshore 0.02(1.00) 0.66(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.02(1.00) 0.62(0.00) 0.64(0.00)
Foreign Listing 0.02(1.00) 0.48(0.00) 0.47(0.00) 0.01(1.00) 0.39(0.00) 0.40(0.00)
Domestic Listing 0.13(0.56) 0.56(0.00) 0.44(0.01) 0.11(0.56) 0.51(0.00) 0.39(0.00)
Listing 0.11(0.73) 0.08(1.00) 0.03(1.00) 0.12(0.46) 0.11(0.86) 0.01(1.00)
Party 0.02(1.00) 0.00(1.00) 0.03(1.00) 0.01(1.00) 0.14(0.67) 0.12(0.91)
TMT 0.06(1.00) 0.49(0.00) 0.56(0.00) 0.06(0.99) 0.37(0.00) 0.43(0.00)
SOE 0.40(0.00) 0.10(0.98) 0.50(0.00) 0.41(0.00) 0.10(0.96) 0.51(0.00)
College Degree 0.00(1.00) 0.37(0.01) 0.37(0.03) 0.11(0.53) 0.38(0.00) 0.26(0.11)
Elite College 0.05(1.00) 0.26(0.12) 0.31(0.09) 0.03(1.00) 0.27(0.03) 0.30(0.05)
Sex 0.05(1.00) 0.01(1.00) 0.06(1.00) 0.03(1.00) 0.02(1.00) 0.05(1.00)
Founding Year 0.12(0.65) 0.57(0.00) 0.56(0.00) 0.10(0.65) 0.51(0.00) 0.50(0.00)
First Headquarter 0.15(0.35) 0.21(0.30) 0.13(0.96) 0.17(0.12) 0.23(0.11) 0.16(0.68)
Notes: This table reports Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution. The number in the table
gives combined K-S statistics and the associated p-value (in parentheses) of the two-sample test statistic
by entrepreneurial type (I, II, or III).
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Party Organ: Explaining Different Outcomes
Sample Forbes (n:301) Hurun’s Expanded Sample (n:375)





Listing SOE SOE TMT TMT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Linear Probability Model:
1|Party -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 301 301 301 301 374 347 374 347
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.41 0.37 0.17 0.14
Panel B. Logit Model:
1|Party -0.18 0.42 -0.45 -0.25 0.58 0.62 0.11 0.06
(0.46) (0.42) (0.40) (0.38) (0.98) (1.00) (0.25) (0.28)
Observations 146 156 176 133 131 122 196 172
Count R2 0.75 0.68 0.67 0.79 0.89 0.88 0.71 0.69
Adj. Count R2 0.33 0.11 0.30 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.22
Notes: This table reports estimates of the difference by entrepreneur type on outcomes using variants of
equation (2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters
(city level). Both linear probability and logit models control year and first headquarter fixed effects. No
other controls are used.
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Chapter 3
Serving the People or the People’s Note: On
the Political Economy of Talent Allocation
3.1 Introduction
Improved talent allocation through occupational choices is central to mod-
ern economic performance. Changes in incentive and reward structure affect
overall economic performances through mobility across industries and sec-
tors1. Removal of developmental barriers unfavorable to entrepreneurship
and imposed as a result of ideological reasons interact with labor market
adjustments and could potentially bring benign outcomes through better al-
location of talents.
This observation resonates with classical work concerning entrepreneur-
ship in an economically backward society when a sudden spurt of develop-
ment raises important questions for the political economy of development
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). Using
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks as an event shock, this paper presents evi-
dence showcasing the impact of the (partial) resolution of political ideologies
on the social composition of super-rich persons in China.
One contribution of this paper is to offer evidence of politically induced
structural changes in the social composition of entrepreneurs. The empiri-
cal work aided by a regression kink design provides an excellent opportunity
1See, for example, Hsieh et al. (2019).
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for detecting as well as estimating the political shock rendered by Deng Xi-
aoping’s Southern Talks, an event shock happening around January 1992.
One novelty of this paper is to estimate the effect of removal developmental
barrier from the ideological side (e.g., Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks) on
entrepreneurship and changing social compositions of super-rich persons.
The title of this paper, Serving the People or the People’s Note, had multi-
faceted interpretations in this context and requires a few elaborations. The
phrase, Serve the People, is a political slogan that can be traced back to Mao’s
era, when the chairman wrote an effusive speech commemorating Zhang Side,
a PLA soldier, for his sacrifice to the party’s cause. Until this day, this phrase
has been officially recognized as a mission statement of the CPC. The other
part of the phrase, the People’s Note, signifies the meaning of the Chinese
dollar, Renminbi (RMB), representing the profit-oriented ventures and the
market sector. In this paper, the choice of title represents a tradeoff facing
elite talents in China around 1992, whether to stay within the party system
or join the wave of market reform and become entrepreneurs2?
Another contribution of this paper is highlighting the interplay between
public and private sectors underpinning economic development, as well as
focusing on how resolutions over key ideological issues through elite politics
help pave the way for rising private sector (Lardy, 2014). Early work on mar-
ket transition in state socialism can be regarded as a useful background (Nee,
1989). Applying a framework of occupation choice across sectors, talent allo-
cation and political selection, this paper complements papers on bureaucratic
competition and selection in the Chinese context, most of which concentrate
on political selection at the local level without a private sector. This research,
however, is associated with papers on talent allocation, occupation choice
of entering into entrepreneurship, as well as choice of public sector careers
(Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) under democratic regimes. This work resonates
closely with a public-private occupation selection in the institutional context
of the political economy of development of China. Internationally, this paper
2 Of course, there is a sarcastic tone of soliciting this question in situations where
the government is deviating from its ideal of serving the people and becoming a profiting
machine itself.
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connects with a host of studies on the social origins of inventors (Bell et al.,
2019; Aghion et al., 2017).
Moreover, this study fits into a large number of studies on the Chinese
economy and private sector development via the lens of decentralization and
federalism (Lau et al., 2000). Despite a large literature on local govern-
ment competition, there remains limited research on the political economy
of talent allocations, especially the interactions between public and private
sector talent allocations that account for the politico-economic performance
of China (Jia et al., 2015). Relatedly, this paper speaks with the economics
of entrepreneurship under the Chinese context (Djankov et al., 2006; Yueh,
2009; Li et al., 2012): whom will become entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries, particularly in the institutional context of uncertainty where capitalist-
roaders could be outlawed by socialist ideological shackles? The resulting
better talent allocation, through the changing social composition of poten-
tial entrepreneurs, to some extent, should be regarded as one of the greatest
triumphs in alleviating commitment problems in the context of an author-
itarian regime. In some sense, this project is a companion paper of Xiao
(2019a) in which the focus has been placed on the foreign financing chan-
nel where politically unconnected grassroots could solicit capital injections
from foreign venture capitalists. This paper, however, stresses the impact of
Deng Xiaoping’s political settlement over certain ideological issues and how
that rather personal solution attenuates commitment problems and remove
developmental barriers for leaping forward.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the institutional context, which serves as the background for the debate over
cage theory3 of socialist market economy and its impact on talent alloca-
tion in China. Aided by a few predictions, section III introduces a new
3 This theoretical view is held by Chen Yun during the 80s. To elaborate the core idea
of this perspective, I quote an early study on Chen Yun and Chinese politics, “By late
1981 and 1982, Chen devoted more attention to the planned economy. He declared that
the relationship between the planned economy and the active economy (i.e., the market)
was like a bird and a cage. The plan was the cage and the bird was the market. If the cage
was too small, the bird would suffocate. If there was no cage, the bird would fly away.
He stressed that planning must continue to govern many parts of the economy, including
agriculture” (Bachman, 1985, p. 152).
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dataset, China’s Super Rich Persons (CSRP). Through the application of a
sharp regression discontinuity kink framework, this paper then estimates the
impact of the Southern Talks on changing social composition of super-rich
entrepreneurs from China. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
3.2 Institutional Context: Deng Xiaoping’s
Southern Talks and the Competing Views
on Market Socialism
This section outlines the institutional context behind this paper. To
briefly summarize Deng’s southern trip4, this paper stresses four major fea-
tures: (i) the timing of Deng’s Southern Talks follows merely one month after
the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), projecting a
signal of urgency in the movement of communist parties; (ii) the older states-
men from party conservatives, particularly Deng’s rivalry camp, Chen Yun
and Li Xiannian, were suffering from health problems near the end of their
death5; (iii) the Tiananmen’s specter had been fading slightly, and finally
(iv) the expected forthcoming party congress would be held by the end of
the year with a confirmation of old agenda (e.g., return to conservatism or
cage theory view of market economy) or announcement of a new political
line.
Meeting the imperatives of the party and new situations globally, Deng
Xiaoping traveled to Guangdong province, the southern part of the country,
where he spent five days in Shenzhen and another six days in Zhuhai, two
of his signature cities in the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) exemplified by
his reform and opening programs. In each of the places he visited with his
family alongside, Deng Xiaoping reasserted the reformist spirit, exhorting
local cadres to experiment with bolder steps in order to kill their way out for
4 Figure C.1.1 in the appendix C.1 offers an event flow of Deng’s Southern Talks.
5 Li Xiannian died half a year following Southern Talks. Chen Yun was invited to join
Deng Xiaoping for the Southern Talks as a signal of party unity, yet failed to show up for
health reasons. See Ch. 23, Vogel (2011).
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a better future. In particular, Deng visualized Shenzhen in the hopes that
one day it would speed up its development by catching up with the four little
dragons: Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
The most formidable challenge that faced the party leadership was ideo-
logical obstacles, given the collapse of USRR and the tragedy of Tiananmen.
The public morale was low and expectations for further crackdowns increased
as policy programs of anti-color revolution unfolded. The theoretical issues
over whether, to what extent, and how a genuine market economy can be
compatible with the ideals and theories of classical socialism were, however,
deliberately brushed away, as Deng asserted famously in one of the passages
within his Southern Talks, circulated first as a formal party document and
crystalized posthumously (circa 1997) as part of the CPC’s official ideologies
and guiding principles, Deng Xiaoping Theory :
Whether or not to have more planning or market-based economy
is not the deciding difference between socialism and capitalism.
The planned economy does not equal socialism, and capitalism
has planning too. The market-based economy does not equal
capitalism either, and socialism can have markets as well. Plans
and markets are nothing but economic means. The fundamental
aim of socialism is to unleash and develop productivity, eliminate
exploitation and economic polarization so as to achieve common
prosperity for all6.
Whilst giving informal sessions to local party officials, reporters from
Hong Kong were spreading the notes of Deng Xiaoping’s speech, an act that
was difficult for the conservatives in Beijing to ignore. Incumbent party
secretary Jiang Zemin remained alerted to the reaction of elders and the
active shots fired by Deng Xiaoping. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong newspaper
6This quote can be found via The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (vol.3), the orig-
inal version in Chinese (The People’s Publisher, 1993/2009.11 version). The specific
paragraph was excerpted from the article titled “Major points over talks from places
like Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai, and others”[Zai Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shanghai dengdi de tanhua yaodian] (Jan. 18 - Feb. 21, 1992). The english translation
was provided by the author of this paper. For English version, the translated text can be
found via Deng (1993).
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and television began to spread Deng’s message. By the time the Southern
Talks ended in January 30, 1992, the official party media was kept silent on
Deng’s trip to Guangdong as well as making no political announcements as
rumors began spread from the southern part of the country. Immediately
afterwards, Deng Xiaoping went to Shanghai with his family members to
enjoy the Chinese New Year for about three weeks after heading to the capital
for a political cleanup, anticipating the outcome of his finale. During the
weeks of the Chinese New Year, party secretaries and high officials paid visits
to Chen Yun for advice, awaiting the changing winds to arrive. Deng Liqun, a
notable party headliner, shot back, clearly reflecting the planner’s message,
“People who stubbornly cling to their liberal beliefs are using anti-leftism
as a pretext to oppose the Communist Party leadership and the socialist
system”7.
However, by then the political tide had shifted entirely in Deng’s favor.
A notice prepared by Beijing on Deng’s talk was circulated to all members
of the central committee by the end of February. From the March Polit-
buro meeting, President Yang Shangkun and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin
were in full support of Deng’s statements. In late May, the party center
initiated the implementations of Deng’s political spirit into concrete policy
packages. Jiang, on June 9, delivered a speech adocating Deng’s speech to
high-level students at the Central Party School. By then, the reformers had
won. As his conservative colleague, Li Xiannian, reached the end of his life,
Chen Yun visited Shanghai Pudong and approved further efforts to economic
development, despite in his cautious tone. As Deng Xiaoping consolidated
his victory with his political agenda, the 14th Party Congress held between
October 12-18, put into the party’s politico-economic agenda as a striving
goal: to build a socialist market economy.
Unlike previous analysis on this topic, this paper offers an alternative the-
ory of institutional adaptation: a combination of elite-driven policy debates
with entrepreneurial responses at the grassroots. Fighting over Maoist and
quasi Maoist ideologies (e.g., Hua Guofeng), Deng fought back to high-level
politics through a Maoist critique of Maoist errors - seeking truth from facts.
7Re-quoted from Ch. 23, Vogel (2011)
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Reigning in party liberals - Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, two successors,
handpicked by him - Deng Xiaoping scapegoated them for failing to handle
strategically criticisms that had been hurled against the party as a conse-
quence of liberating policy over the course of reformist path8. In the case of
Hu Yaobang - a good-hearted comrade by all accounts, Deng considered him
to be too lenient on the party’s political enemies, who not only disagreed
with the fundamental lines of the party but also cannot be reasonably con-
vinced. For Zhao Ziyang, the failed pricing reforms almost invalidated the
“dual-track” approach9 by escalating student protests and public anger over
profiting from the gap between “planned price” governed by state quotas and
market prices. The moment the policymakers were viewed as both promot-
ers and beneficiaries of reform, the political logic as well as moral appeals
crumbled into tears.
The tragedy of Tiananmen and the subsequent reassertion of power by
the party conservatives (Chen Yun and Li Xiannian), not to mention the
promotion of Jiang Zemin, Shanghai party chief, seemed to have scored for
the conservatives: the markets are allowed but would be kept small. This
is where Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks came in, taking on the conserva-
tives when the two elders were ailing (Li Xiannian died in 1992 and Chen
Yun 1995). How Deng Xiaoping turned around a losing game into a stun-
ning victory for the reformist spirits amid a pessimistic and depressing mood
following the Tiananmen tragedy and capitalized on that political victory
through formal party documents was a major historical event for CPC. It
capstone the phrase, “market economy”, firmly into the ideology of Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics, eventually sidelining the theoretical debate
over the relationship among capitalism, socialism, and markets. This could
be what Deng sincerely meant by saying that “China must watch out for the
8Speaking from the lens of socio-scientific perspective of the political economy analysis,
any policy reform entails naturally an uneven set of gainers and loser in absolute as well
as relative levels, if not rates. The size of gains and losses among gainers and losers can
be quite diffused.
9Economists (Lau et al., 2000) seem to applaud that as a success, which this au-
thor cautiously disagrees. The dual-track approach to reform could have undermined the
party’s legitimacy, had not full transitions to socialist market economy been enshrined
into the party’s constitution.
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Right, but mainly defend against the Left.” (Baum, 1996, p. 341)
In short, from the perspective of leadership initiated institutional change,
Deng’s South Talks was recognized as a critical watershed event not only
because of political content within the Southern Talks, but more importantly,
how the battle of ideas paved the way for a final consolidation of a political
victory over the competing vision proffered by the cage theory of market
socialism. With Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun leaving the political podium,
China’s institutional transition into full-fledged market socialism became the
outcome of an inevitable end to a set of conflicting ideological battles of the
80s, an era of catching up development.
3.3 An Empirical Exercise
In this section, I outline the economic logic that lays the groundworks for
Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping’s visions. This can be formalized via a model.
Let’s consider an economy with three different kinds of occupations (agents):
the public servants, the private firm owners (entrepreneurs), and the workers.
In a simple form, each person carries with them with a different measure of
ability and motivation to serve the public. In this economy the individual
agent can choose his or her occupation. The public servants receive public
wages, ego rents, and other forms of compensations. The private firm owners
maximize the profit of his firm. The workers can choose between the public
or the private sector. Define a static equilibrium to a a situation where no
agent can improve his or her welfare by changing occupation. Consider two
situations in this model economy: one with a strict limit on hiring workers
for the private sector (i.e., the cage economy)10 and the other without such
limits11.
I consider a transition from the cage economy to a market economy with-
out cages. Consider two measures for comparison: extensive margins, defined
as the number of private firms in the economy, and intensive margins, de-
10This is more or less consistent with Chen Yun’s vision. Empirically, China has wit-
nessed a period of reform where labor hiring for the private sector has quantitative limits.
11This coincides with Deng’s vision of market economy.
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fined as the average value of top private firms associated with the super rich
entrepreneurs12. The study of super rich persons in China is more closely re-
lated to intensive rather than extensive margins. However, empirically, both
margins of the private sector increased since Southern Talks. Figure 3.1 plots
two curves presenting the changing numbers of private firms and small owner
firms (getihu) during China’s reform era, documented by National Bureau
of Statistics. Since Deng’s Southern Talks, both curves witnessed an upward
trend.
As an imperfect measure of intensive margins, Figure 3.2 offers a series of
box plots depicting the wealth dispersions from the fifties super-rich Chinese
persons from 2000 to 2018 in a great transformation (Brandt and Rawski,
2008). Initially, the gap amongst the wealthiest persons was small before
2007, nonetheless that dispersion rose to a situation where a few superstar
billionaires outpaced each other within the group of super-rich persons in our
database.
Therefore, the role of Deng’s Southern Talks served the purpose of devia-
tion from Chen Yun’s cage theory and paved the reformers’ way to carrying
out Deng Xiaoping’s version. Essentially, by lifting the cage bars on hir-
ing labors would ultimately increase the size of the private firm and allow
ambitious entrepreneurs to fulfill their dreams, resulting in an increase of
entrepreneurial surplus. Next, with an expected gain in the private sector,
the most capable people would leave the public sector, decreasing compe-
titions within the highly motivated political elites. Finally, a larger size of
the private sector would then in turn boost the base of government revenue,
creating a countervailing effects to the loss of talents within the public sector.
Following this logic, this paper advances the thesis that the removal of
developmental barriers imposed for political economy reasons (Chen Yun’s
cage, in this case), could offer several explanations/predictions for the em-
pirical work:
1. The private sector expands in both intensive and extensive margins,
12Other measurements are possible. For example, intensive margins can be defined as
the average labor hirings or tax payments for the top private firms associated with the
super rich persons.
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consistent with Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.
2. High ability people are leaving the public sector (especially around the
kink) and starting to become entrepreneurs. This can be detected by the
fact that the social compositions of the entrepreneurs (especially around the
kink) begin to change.
The empirical part of the paper concentrates on the second point of the
prediction. To move further, a few caveats are needed. The empirical dif-
ficulty in assessing the predictions of the model outlined in the previous is
to find a credible source of political shocks and identify the response from
the entrepreneurial side. This is further complicated by two issues, mostly
driven by data: studies on political economy tend to use either local source
of variations to identify the impact of decentralized competition, or private
enterprise surveys, at often times missing the interaction between the two.
In this paper, using Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks as an exogenous polit-
ical shock with credibly commitment impacts, I assess the changing social
composition of the super-rich persons in China - focusing on the superstars.
This novel approach has a number of benefits. First, in contrast to local vari-
ations, the regression discontinuity kink design exploits a nationwide shock
as a way to gauge evidence for any plausible structural changes. Second, the
regression discontinuity kink design offers some insights over the prediction
of the models and addresses a challenge to Xiao (2019a): the role of gen-
eration shifts in changing the composition of super-rich persons. The idea
is to offer evidence confirming the impact of a politically-induced structural
change on the set of persons joining entrepreneurship and becoming super-
star wealth creators. In the absence of the event of Southern Talks (i.e., with
cage imposed), the effects from mere generation shifts possess the possibility
of being smaller than what is realized and predicted by the proposed frame-
work. Thirdly, this project relates the changes in the social composition of
super-rich entrepreneurs to the impact-driven by Southern Talks, which is
critical for the subsequent generation shift.
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3.3.1 Empirical Framework: Regression Kink Design
The research design using an event shock like the Southern Talks suggests
an empirical strategy based on a regression discontinuity kink design using
semi-parametric techniques:
yipc = α+ρ1Ti+ρ2Ti×f(time distancei)+Z ′iβ+f(time distancei)+Φpc+εipc
(3.1)
Where yipc is the outcome of the research interest for a super rich person
i based in province p with cohort c, and Ti is an indicator variable equal
to one if the person i entered into entrepreneurship after Southern Talks,
with zero otherwise. The founding year of the company by person i, a run-
ning variable, is used to determine whether it has been affected by Southern
Talks. Zi belong to a set of socio-economic variables (i.e., characteristics of
the entrepreneur) independent of the assignment variable Ti. f(.) is the re-
gression discontinuity polynomial function, controlling for the shape around
the neighborhood of discontinuous shock. Lastly, Φpc is a set of interaction
terms between province and cohort fixed effects. In some specifications, Φpc
is simply modeled as Φpc = θp + γc.
Regression discontinuity design has been used widely in spatial models
(Dell, 2010; He et al., 2020) and election studies (Lee, 2008). In practice, f(.)
represents a polynomial function of the gap to the year of Southern Talks,
1992. The treatment assignment variable, Ti ≡ 1(Found Yeari > 1992), des-
ignates the post Southern Talks binary13. The treatment impacts, ρs where
s ∈ {1, 2}, capture the impact of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks on the set
of entrepreneurial composition, under the assumption that the suitable win-
dow offers the right comparison. If ρ1 = 0, then the regression discontinuity
design captures the structural change induced by Southern Talks. If ρ1 ∕= 0,
not only the outcome of interest changes following Southern Talks but also
jumps at the discontinuous point14.
13 In the appendix section C.3, anecdotal evidence is provided to support this character-
ization. In short, Deng’s Southern Talks gave rise to a cohort of billionaire entrepreneurs
who previously held state sector jobs.
14 To ensure against treating regression discontinuity as regression kink, both regression
discontinuity design and regression kink design estimates are considered (Angrist and
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The estimating framework based on sharp regression discontinuity design
relies on two critical identifying assumptions (Card et al., 2015). One, the
assignment variable, the time location to Southern Talks cannot be fully con-
trolled by those choosing entrepreneurship before Southern Talks yet affects
later comers. This implies that the suitable choice of the window for the
comparison between those entrepreneurs joining prior to Southern Talks and
immediately following the design afterward approximates a good experiment.
Formally speaking, let yi1 and yi0 denote two potential outcomes under treat-
ment and control. The entry year of an entrepreneur i determines not only the
value of Ti, but also the time distancei ≡ (the year of entry into entrepreneurshipi−
1992) from Southern Talks. This value can be used as inputs for f(.). The
running variable in the context can thus be the time distance defined above,
or the raw year of entry by an entrepreneur. Identification requires at the dis-
continuous threshold, conditional expectation function (CEF) for E[yi1|tdi]
and E[yi0|tdi] are continuous for an approximately good random assignment.
To assess the above concern, I examine the summary statistics table (see
Table 3.1) of two groups separated by the Southern Talks with a suitable
choice of windows: full sample, 1980-2000, and 1985-199515. Across the five
target measure of the social compositions, none of them are significantly
different in terms of difference-test and distributional test across the three
window periods. Thus, this could be taken as a confidence check for a plausi-
bly good random assignment16. Amongst full sample and the window period
of 20 years (1980-2000), the level of education has increased significantly,
which could be indicative of strong generational change, consistent with sig-
nificant changes in distribution. Yet, column (9) of Table 3.1 showcases that
the changes are less significant in a narrow window. This signal of evidence
could be supportive of the story: Deng’s Southern Talk has somewhat facil-
itated generational changes by increasing the share of college graduates.
Pischke, 2008).
15 Other datasets and settings might be capable of performing a bandwidth selection. In
this particular context, the bandwidth selection is decided by these three window periods.
16 To ensure against treating regression discontinuity as regression kink, both regression
discontinuity design and regression kink design estimates are considered (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008).
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In addition, the continuity of the running variable at the kink needs to
be ensured against manipulation. To make an assessment of the validity of
the assumptions underlying the regression discontinuity and regression kink
design, Figure 3.3 offers the histogram and kernel density reflecting the enter-
ing year of the first job (Panel A) as opposed to becoming an entrepreneur
(Panel B). Most of the super-rich persons in our database were employed
far earlier than the time of Southern Talks whereas the timing of becom-
ing an entrepreneur was shown to be rather balanced across the two sides
of Southern Talks. Notably, the entry years of the super rich persons seem
to be concentrated around the timing of Southern Talks and gradually fade
out, suggesting that the high chances of becoming super rich are somewhat
associated with a small window period around Southern Talks.
Manipulation testing for falsification of regression discontinuity design re-
quires that those entrepreneurs could delay their investment projects knowing
that Deng Xiaoping would do something to overturn the gloomy mood in the
midst of the post-Tiananmen. This situation was rather unlikely because it
requires the knowledge of the timing of USRR’s collapse as well as the re-
sponse given by Deng via Southern Talks. To address this concern, I falsify
the continuity assumption of the running variable around the cutoff using a
variant of McCrary (2008). Appendix Figure C.3.1 presents a density conti-
nuity test near the cutoff (Cattaneo et al., 2018). A local polynomial density
estimator by Cattaneo et al. (2019) turns out a robust T value of 1.3304 with
an associated p-value of 0.1834, suggesting that manipulation of entry was
rather unlikely.
3.3.2 The Impact of Southern Talks on the Social Com-
position of Entrepreneurs
In this section, the impact of Southern Talks on the changing social com-
position entrepreneurs is estimated under the evaluation of a number of mea-
sures. The dataset applied in this paper is compiled by the author and his
coauthors via CSRP project, funded by a research grant proffered by National
Social Science Foundation of China (18ASH003) under the title ”Research
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on New Generation of China’s Private Entrepreneurs: Social Composition,
Attitude, and Actions”.
In short, the overarching aim is to look for plausible structure turning
points as well as immediate impacts as induced by Southern Talks. While the
presence of generation shifts does provide a threat to my identification strate-
gies, this lurking factor coevolves with the documented structural changes
rather than becoming a contributing factor to it at a particular time. In
other words, despite shifts in generational characteristics, Deng’s Southern
Talks as a politically exogenous event facilitates the changes in these variables
that are plausibly detected by the regression kink design. In all graphs and
regressions, cohort fixed effects are included to minimize the unobservable
generational shifting factors.
Graphical Evidence:
I begin my discussion by plotting three outcome variables for the CSRP
against the running variable, as shown in Figure 3.4. These are binned
scatterplots, a non-parametric method of plotting the conditional expecta-
tion function, through absorption of unobservable provincial and cohort level
fixed effects. Among CSRP, Panel A documents a piece of evidence reveal-
ing that the share of college degree holders continuously increases up until
the South Talks, an event which marked promising opportunities for wealth
making, then gradually declines as the corresponding window of opportu-
nity fades out. This is consistent with the picture of Panel C where those
well-educated persons having state sector jobs leaving their careers around
that window of opportunity. Panel A and C thus provide visual evidence
of high ability, highly educated state sector former employees leaving their
careers and venturing into entrepreneurs, eventually making to the top. In
both cases, the highest share is reached at the time of Southern Talk. Panel
B shows that the share of party members do not change drastically before
and after the Southern Talks.
Accordingly I plot these three measures respectively for the parental fa-
ther of the CSRP in Figure 3.517. The picture is less clear. The share of
17 A recent paper on entrepreneurship in China has tackled the question of social
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party membership does not change significantly before and after the South-
ern Talks (Panel E). The share of college degree for the parental father seems
to have reached a low point while that share for the individual has climbed
to a climax point (Panel D). In panel F, the trend of a declining share for
the parental father of CSRP does not stop after the Southern Talks.
Another binned scatterplot is provided by Figure 3.6 on the age structure
(Panel A) and gender composition (Panel B) of the entrepreneur. Panel A
documents a slight change in the age structure of entering CSRP: the cohort
becomes younger on average following Southern Talks with a flatter slope.
By contrast, the share of female entrepreneurs in the CSRP reversed from a
growing trend to an experience of declination.
Regression Estimates:
Table 3.2 reports the regression kink estimates for the changing social
composition of super-rich persons following Southern Talks, with standard
errors clustered at the provincial level and cohort level. Across all specifi-
cations, the estimated coefficients for the jump (ρ1) is inadequate in signif-
icantly rejecting zero. Three specifications using second-order polynomials
(column 2, 5, and 8) do not increase explanatory power, giving credence to
an underlying linear trend. The kink effect (ρ2) on share of college degrees
(column 1, 2, and 3) offers an estimate between -0.027 and -0.037, confirming
that the graphical evidence of panel A of Figure 3.4. This could mean that
the share of college degree holders amongst the CSRP drops by about 10%
in three years’ time from South Talks, absence of other changes. The fact
that a large number of highly education persons joining entrepreneurs, among
which a few stand out, suggests that the existence of this specific window op-
portunity around the Southern Talks mentioned earlier. The fact that these
highly educated people have flocked into the trend of founding their own
business around that window period is coupled with another fact: quite a
few of these career switchers have previously served in the state sector. Based
on the specification (7) and (9), the estimated kink effect is approximately
−6%. Ultimately, both values reach close to the top of their values at or
determinants of self-employment (Jia et al., 2019).
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nearby the event of Southern Talks. This is a strong supportive evidence for
the anecdotal evidence of an existence of the 1992 cohort of entrepreneurs18.
Given the magnitude of the effects, the event of Southern Talks significantly
affected the intensive margin of China’s private sector, as measured by the
composition of super rich persons.
The kink effect on the share of party membership is somewhat less ef-
fective, as shown in panel B of Figure 3.4. The kink effect is estimated to
be nonsignificant, failing to indicate that this value reached the peak during
the event of Southern Talks. In other words, this statistic in particular is
less strongly related to the share of college degree holders and that of state
sector experience among CSRP sample.
Table 3.3 reports the estimated kink effects for the parental father of these
super-rich persons following Southern Talks using the same outcome variables
as for the persons themselves. Following results from column (2), (5), and (8),
the estimated effects on the second-order polynomial, as in the previous case,
fail to generate meaningful results. Across all specifications, the estimated
jump effects and the kink effects cannot significantly reject the zero threshold.
This meant that during the window of money making opportunity around the
Southern Talks parental characteristics among CSRP were only marginally
related to the core story. Those people who flocked into entrepreneurship
with college degree and prior state sector experiences were having all sort of
parental fathers, making detectable changes regarding these attributes less
visible. To put it differently, the window of opportunities surrounding the
Southern Talks can be viewed as a fair race open to all children of family
backgrounds.
The following exercise tests that the core storyline holds true among
various kinds of window periods and remains robust against control variables.
Table 3.4 deals with issues regarding multiple windows since the regression
kink design seeks to capture local effects. Restricting the sample to a window
of 1980-2000 (column 1 and 3), the estimated kink effects remain robust to the
magnitude for the share of college degree and the share of state employment
at −3% and −6% respectively. Further shrinking the sample size to a window
18Appendix C.3 provides more detailed information.
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period of 1985-1995 (column 2 and 4) seems to coincide with the window
of opportunity unleashed by Southern Talks. None of the estimated kink
effects can significantly reject zero at 5%, indicative of a period known as
“sea jumping” that defines the instance when state employees switched their
jobs to become entrepreneurs as their expectations over return prospects
(adjusted for risk preference) began to shift in the midst of the grand debates
over planned economy versus market economy19.
Table 3.5 examines this consistent relationship against two control vari-
ables: gender and ethnicity. Using full sample, the kink effect for the share
of college degree stands at 3.7% in the negative for both variables (column 1
and 2). Similarly, under the full sample, the kink effect for the share of state
employments is estimated to be at 6.7% in the negative for these two con-
trols (column 3 and 4), showing that the variability of ethnicity and gender
is small compared with the main effect.
One could possibly argue that the year of Southern Talks may not have
been the “correct” shock year for a regression kink design. Table 3.6 exam-
ines the timing of the kink effects using four alternative timing indicators.
Looking at panel A and B as the timing of event ”moves” one and two years
ahead respectively, the kink effects on the share of college degree holders
remain at the right magnitude but with larger standard errors. On the other
hand, the magnitude on the kink effect inflates. One explanation of this in-
flation is that the share of college degree holders, the statistic, has reached
its peak earlier than that of state employment, another statistic. In addition,
following the Southern Talks, those with state employment jobs continue to
flow into the private marketplace, thus delaying the peak for that particular
value. As a result, the kink estimates becomes larger in absolute values.
This explanation is consistent with the estimated coefficient shown in panel
C an D when the timing of the event ”moves” backwards first in one year
and then two. The kink effects on the share of college degree holders go up
in absolute terms from the original 3.7% (column 3, Table 3.2) to 4% (Panel
19Appendix Table C.1.1 considers a non-parametric and data-driven estimation method
based on Calonico et al. (2014). Across three methods (conventional, bias-corrected, and
robust), the share of state-employment declined significantly by 6% per year for the super-
rich persons after Southern Talks.
CONCLUSION 106
D, Table 3.6). The estimated coefficient on the share of state employment
remain roughly the same at around 6% in absolute values.
Holistically, the presented evidence indicates that the timing of 1992 is
one of the major impacting point consolidating the political vision. The win-
dow of opportunity might have already opened up prior to 1992, perhaps
going back to 1985-1988. That is the reason why those individuals eventu-
ally becoming super rich persons utilizes that window period of opportunity,
confirming the concentration of entrepreneurial entries in panel B of Figure
3.3. Viewed from the sample of CSRP, Deng’s Southern Talks facilitates and
consolidates the trends that have already been lurking in the late 80s, had it
not been abruptly interrupted by the Tiananmen Tragedy.
3.4 Conclusion
Using Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talks as a historical event, this paper
applies the estimations from the kink eects of an exogenous political shock
on the social composition of successful entrepreneurs. The paper’s analysis
shows that a number of the most intelligent and highly educated former state
employees have understood Deng’s message and captured that window of
opportunity around the period of his Southern Talks, eventually joining the
small population that consist of super rich persons in China. The regression
kink estimates report a 3% decline in the share of college degree holders and
6% decline in the share of state-employment history amongst the sample of
super rich Chinese persons, revealing the fact that highly educated persons
with state sector experiences have understood the messages of Southern Talks
and utilized that window of opportunity to their advantages. By highlighting
the channel of talent allocation, this paper attempts to offer another plausible
channel underpinning China’s economic success through the perspective of
political commitments.
Based on a dataset gathering the fifty richest persons in mainland China,
this paper presents suggestive evidence that underpin the impact of Southern
Talks on the social composition regarding this set. However, the reported
evidence is still primitive. Indeed, the evidence reported here can only be ex-
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plorative and experimental future research could trace the impact of Southern
Talks on many different layers of Chinese political economy. Lack of com-
prehensive personal history data on the super rich people who marginally
fell behind top 50 could biases the estimate of effects. Therefore, the results
reported here at best complement studies like (Fan and Lu, 2019 (2017) in
its application of career histories and multi-year private enterprise surveys.
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Figure 3.1: Two Measures of Extensive Margin: Number of Private Firms
and Small Owner Firms (Getihu)
Notes: The red curve represents the evolution of the number of small owner firms (getihu)
and the blue curve represents the evolution of the number of private firms. The source of
the data comes from National Bureau of Statistics, available at data. stats. gov. cn .
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Figure 3.2: Wealth Distribution of the Super Rich Chinese Persons: An
Imperfect Measure of Intensive Margin
Note: This plot graphs the evolution of wealth distributions of the super rich persons in
China from 2000 to 2018. For each boxplot, the dispersion is shown for a particular year.
Dataset: CSRP (Lu et al.).
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Note: Panel A depicts the histogram and kernel density of the entering year of first job.
Panel B depicts the histogram and kernel density of entering year as an entrepreneur.
The red vertical line denotes year = 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Talks.
Dataset: CSRP (Lu et al.).
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Figure 3.4: Graphical Evidence: The Impact on The Person’s Attributes
Panel A Panel B
Panel C
Note: This plot provides the regression discontinuity plot based on binned scatterplots, after
absorbing provincial and cohort fixed effects. Outcome variable of interests from Panel A-
C: the share of college degree, the share of party membership and the share of state sector
experience by the entrepreneurs. The red vertical line denotes year = 1992 where Deng
Xiaoping made Southern Talks. Dataset: CSRP. (Lu et al.)
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Figure 3.5: Graphical Evidence: The Impact on Father’s Attributes
Panel D Panel E
Panel F
Note: This plot provides the regression discontinuity plot based on scatterbins, absorbing
provincial and cohort fixed effects. Outcome variable of interests from Panel D-F: the
share of college degree, share of party membership, share of state sector experience by the
entrepreneurs by the father of the entrepreneur. The red vertical line denotes year = 1992
where Deng Xiaoping made Southern Talks. Dataset: CSRP. (Lu et al.)
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Figure 3.6: Graphical Evidence: Other Covariates
Panel A
Panel B
Note: Panel A and panel B provides binned scatter plot of the age of the entrepreneur and
gender composition (male = 1). The red vertical line denotes year = 1992 when Deng







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Robustness Checks: Multiple Windows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
college college stateemploy stateemploy
T 0.008 -0.108 -0.011 -0.179
(0.109) (0.208) (0.117) (0.160)
(0.035) (0.203) (0.049) (0.045)
[0.103] [0.174] [0.103] [0.177]
TD 0.033 0.040 0.039 0.028
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015)
[0.011] [0.022] [0.007] [0.031]
TD × T -0.030 0.028 -0.061 0.040
(0.028) (0.096) (0.022) (0.047)
[0.018] [0.096] [0.012] [0.069]
Interaction FE YES YES YES YES
Window 1980-2000 1985-1995 1980-2000 1985-1995
N 339 234 357 242
R2 0.243 0.277 0.293 0.301
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level and cohort
level. The standard errors in the brackets are based on the Huber-White robust errors. T
stands for incidence of Southern Talks in 1992. TD refers to the time distance to Southern
Talks. An unreported constant is included in each specification. Column (1)-(2) use the
person’s college degrees as binary dependent variable. Column (3)-(4) use the person’s
state employment as binary dependent variable.
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Table 3.5: Robustness Checks: Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
college college stateemploy stateemploy
T 0.009 0.010 0.055 0.069
(0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085)
(0.100) (0.104) (0.058) (0.060)
[0.090] [0.090] [0.089] [0.089]
TD 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.032
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
TD × T -0.037 -0.037 -0.067 -0.067
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Interaction FE YES YES YES YES
Window Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Controls Gender Ethnicity Gender Ethnicity
N 372 372 393 393
R2 0.258 0.253 0.281 0.291
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level and cohort
level. The standard errors in the brackets are based on the Huber-White robust errors. T
stands for incidence of Southern Talks in 1992. TD refers to the time distance to Southern
Talks. An unreported constant is included in each specification. Column (1)-(2) use the
person’s college degrees as binary dependent variable. Column (3)-(4) use the person’s
state employment as binary dependent variable.
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Table 3.6: Further Examination of the Kink
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
college college college stateemploy stateemploy stateemploy
Panel A: Year = 1993
Kink Effect -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.073 -0.073 -0.074
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Control No Gender Ethnicity No Gender Ethnicity
R2 0.253 0.258 0.253 0.282 0.277 0.287
Panel B: Year = 1994
Kink Effect -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.090 -0.090 -0.091
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Control No Gender Ethnicity No Gender Ethnicity
R2 0.251 0.256 0.252 0.288 0.288 0.300
Panel C: Year = 1991
Kink Effect -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.065 -0.065 -0.064
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Control No Gender Ethnicity No Gender Ethnicity
R2 0.254 0.259 0.254 0.280 0.280 0.291
Panel D: Year = 1990
Kink Effect -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.063 -0.063 -0.062
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Control No Gender Ethnicity No Gender Ethnicity
R2 0.255 0.260 0.255 0.278 0.278 0.287
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level. All regressions use interacted
fixed effects. Kink effect refers to estimated coefficient ρ2 in equation (3.1). An unreported
constant is included in each specification.Column (1)-(3) use the person’s college degrees




Does Authoritarian Turnover Deliver?
A.1 Additional Information
Authoritarian Turnover in a Regime Transition Framework and Its Rela-
tionship with the Democratization Literature.
Papers on political transition and development are often concerned with a
binary coding scheme for democracy and dictatorship, an analysis that might
overemphasize the effect of changing institutional rather than the selection
of leaders. My contribution to pinpointing ATs offers an estimation opportu-
nity by focusing on part of the democratizing effects. Technically speaking,
this paper proposes a decomposition of previous effect, which captures the
democratization effects, defined as E(∆ysct(1) − ∆ysct(0)|Dct = 1), following
a transition to democracy on GDP s period after time t for country c, after
democratization at time t for country c (Dct = 1). My analysis is split into
two parts: the effect of ATs, which measures the effects from authoritarian
turnovers, and transitional effects from democratizing.
To see this, define Tct = 1 if an old authoritarian regime for country
c breaks down at time t. Either one of the two possible scenario, barring
civil war or other anomalies, must occur: a transition into a new authoritar-
ian regime with leadership turnover or democratizing. The new formulation
below:
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∆s = E(∆ysct(T = 1)−∆ysct(T = 0)|Tct = 1)$ %& '
average effect from political turnover
+ E(∆ysct(D = 1, T = 1)−∆ysct(D = 0, T = 1)|Dct = 1, Tct = 1)$ %& '
democratising effect
(A.1)
The first line expresses effects from ATs, the average effect from au-
thoritarian turnovers, conditional on the breakdown of an old authoritarian
regime, the expected changes in growth rate between countries that experi-
enced turnovers and those without turnovers. The second line captures the
democratizing effect as a premium: conditional on regime breakdown, the
expected difference on changes in growth rate between democratization and
creation of a new authoritarian state. The novelty of using ATs eliminates
the democratizing effect and offers an estimate of regime turnover effects.
Additional Information on Regime Heterogeneity.
Figure A.1.1 shows a box plot of the duration of regimes by 2010, sepa-
rating into two cases: those that are still alive and those that are deceased.
Conditional on survival, monarchical systems have persistent longevity and
have more extended governing periods as compared to others. Military juntas
have both the smallest surviving years and variability among them. Party
regimes, in general, outperform personal regimes, as shown in panel A of
Figure A.1.1.
Variability among deceased regimes follow a similar pattern and yet dif-
fer in terms of the variability. (panel B of Figure A.1.1). Military juntas
scored poorly on the metric of regime duration in both those that are alive
and decreased by 2010. Furthermore, a significant fraction of personal and
military regimes cannot outlive an “average” party regime. In each of the
categories, a few outliners are noticeable. In both panels, it appears that the
probability of turnover is related to the type of prior regime.
Conditional on the breakdown, authoritarian regimes fare differently based
on the type of the previous regime, as shown in the number of deaths during
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Figure A.1.1: Authoritarian Regimes and Durations
Panel A: Type of Surviving Regimes
by 2010
Panel B: Type of Deceased Regimes
by 2010
Source: Geddes et al. (2014).
Figure A.1.2: Authoritarian Regimes and Transitions
Panel A: Level of Violence during
Transition
Panel B: Type of Subsequent Regime
after Breakdown
Source: Geddes et al. (2014).
the transition as a proxy to the level of violence (panel A of Figure A.1.2) and
the type of subsequent regime (panel B of Figure A.1.2). Personal regimes
have the highest chance of having more than 1,000 deaths during the transi-
tion, the second being by military regimes. Monarchies, on the other hand,
experienced the most peaceful transition in terms of the number of deaths
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and the number of failed states after the transition. Panel B of Figure A.1.2
shows that apart from the monarchy regime, which has a disproportionate
probability of democratization, the probability of having turnovers is about
as high as democratization.
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Appendix B
Becoming Global Billionaires from Mainland
China
B.1 Supporting Materials for Variable Inter-
est Entity (VIE)
Figure B.1.1 represents the basic structure for the variable interest entity
(VIE).
Figure B.1.1: The Basic Structure of a Variable Interest Entity (VIE)
Source: Gillis (2012)
Figure B.1.2 represents the operating VIE structure used by Alibaba.
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Figure B.1.2: Alibaba’s Variable Interest Entity (VIE)
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (2014, May 6), Alibaba Group Hold-




The four features of framework establishes three core hypothesis on which
the empirical tests are conducted to verify. They define an optimal invest-
ment problem within the context of the political economy of development.
Beginning from an equilibrium allocation of entrepreneurship under a closed
economy, this paper points out that liquidity is inefficiently allocated to the
politically connected entrepreneurs via state-owned banks, as a result of ei-
ther higher setup costs (e.g., the risk of expropriation) or preferential treat-
ment to the politically connected entrepreneurs1. Then I consider the impact
of an open economy on the allocation of liquidity to potential entrepreneurs.
My research show that even though there is a certain financing cost to trans-
fer a portion of the equity to foreign venture capitalists involves a financial
cost, the politically unconnected entrepreneurs could attenuate both their
exposures to financial and political economy frictions afterward, a result in
an equilibrium that constitutes a better matching between projects and fi-
nancing. By comparing these two equilibria, this paper discusses how the
option of getting finance from foreign VCs opens up new possibilities and its
relations to mixed entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990).
The timeline of the financing game involves three dates, as in Holmström
and Tirole (2001): date 0, date 1, and date 2. First, each entrepreneur de-
cides whether or not to pay for setup costs of a project. Second, when a
liquidity shock kicks in, each entrepreneur submits his or her preferred liq-
uidity demands. Third, a state-owned bank decides to allocate its liquidity,
taking into account that the politically connected entrepreneurs can access
liquidity in a preferential order over the unconnected ones because of the as-
sumed behavior of state-owned banks. Fourth, the reinvestment stage yields
a private benefit to entrepreneurs of all types, depending on differentiated
productivity.
This paper is based on Holmström and Tirole (2001). I expand their
1Such de facto preferential treatments to the politically connected entrepreneurs can
be driven by many factors, not necessarily of political origin. For example, the state-own
banks might not have reliable technology to differentiate and monitor the unconnected
entrepreneurs and would have to rely on a social network of trust.
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framework by relating the setup cost of project and liquidity provision to the
social and political origin of an entrepreneur. This part is divided into several
subsections. The timeline and structure of the game follow from the examples
in Holmström and Tirole (2001) with a few simplifying assumptions to start
with. At date 0, the entrepreneur pays a setup cost I > 0 and decide liquidity
L in the following date 1. At this stage, the setup cost, I, is assumed to be a
small I > 0 to distinguish frictions from liquidity needs and barriers to entry
given the nature of political unconnectedness for some the entrepreneurs. At
date 1, a realization of random income x from distribution G(x) is drawn.
Instead of assuming that a distribution G(x) continuous in x on [0,∞), I
consider a two-point realizations of {xH , xL}. For further simplification, this
paper assumes xL = 0 and xH high enough without the need to seek for a
financial intermediary (see below and proof of Lemma 1). The probability
of xH occurring is p. At date 1, the entrepreneur can decide over whether to
increase an additional amount y ≥ 0 to generate a payoff of by − y2; b > 1
at date 2, a risk-averse representation. As in Holmström and Tirole (2001),
none of the period 2 is pledgeable so that the only possible and complete
contract is through date-1 income x. The market imperfection is driven by
the incompleteness through the non-pledgeability of income on date 2, as in
Holmström and Tirole (2001). Investors (banks as well as VCs from outside
mainland China) have a risk-neutral preference with zero discount rate to
make easy calculations. To meet liquidity needs in the next date, at date-0,
the entrepreneurs of all types would have to purchase liquidity technology
L at a price q, which by definition q − 1 represents the premium. When q
exceeds one, it indicates a shortage of liquidity for the entrepreneur.
First, this paper repeats a result from Holmström and Tirole (2001) on the
basis of a simplifying assumption. Secondly, it shows that under conditions
of a closed economy, only two types2 of entrepreneurs are admissible. This
situation is destabilized under an open economy with the possibility of foreign
VC financing. Finally, this paper concludes with a brief discussion of welfare
considerations.
2This corresponds to the two types of firms as in Song et al. (2011).
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The liquidity constraint for each realization of x ∈ {xH , xL}:
y(x) + t(x) ≤ x+ L (B.1)
t(x) denotes the payment to entrepreneur at date-1. In my optimal contract,
I follow Holmström and Tirole (2001) in searching for one with t(x) = 0 for
x ∈ {xH , xL}.
The next condition represents a date-0 non zero profit condition:
p[xH − y(xH)− (q − 1)L] + (1− p)[xL − y(xL)− (q − 1)L] ≥ I (B.2)
To solve this simplified model, I are looking for an optimal contract {L∗, y(xH), y(xL)}








subject to non-negative profit condition and liquidity constraints.
Lemma 1 (Holmström and Tirole (2001)). There is an optimal liquidity
need L∗ such that when L̄ > L∗ (if and only if q = 1) the entrepreneur does
not have a binding liquidity constraint. When L̄ < L∗, there is an exogenous
shortage of liquidity such that q > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:










+ µ[p[xH − y(xH)− (q − 1)L] + (1− p)[xL − y(xL)− (q − 1)L]− I] (B.4)
First order-condition with respect to y(xH), y(xL) yields for unconstrained
L: y(xH) = y(xL) = b − µ = y∗ Given the assumption in the text, when
xH > y
∗ happens, y(xH) = y
∗ = b − µ. When xL = 0 happens, y(xL) = L,
the amount of carried liquidity. Plug in y(xH) and y(xL) into the constrained
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problem, choose L to maximze:
max
L
p[b(b− µ)− (b− µ)
2
2




+ µ[p[xH − b+ µ− (q − 1)L] + (1− p)[−L− (q − 1)L]− I] (B.5)
Assume that L > 0, the first condition condition yields:
L∗ = b− µ[q − p
1− p ] (B.6)
As a special case of Holmström and Tirole (2001), when q = 1, there is no
liquidity demand, so there is no need to carry extra liquidity. Therefore, it
is feasible to implement first-best outcome L∗ = b − 1, with µ = 1 even in
the state of xL. When q > 1, the liquidity need is binding (µ > 1), and the
date-1 reinvestment is invalid as a result of shortage of liquidity.
When a finite amount constrains the total liquidity offered by the state-
owned banks, L̄, the optimal investment for a second-best contract would
need to be compared with the exogenous supply of liquidity offered, in this
case, by state-owned banks in a closed economy.
Proposition 1 (Impact of Inefficient Institutions through Setup Cost). As-
suming that the only difference between the politically connected and uncon-
nected entrepreneurs are such that the grassroots are facing higher set-up cost
I than the counterparts (e.g., Ic < Iu), under the same date-1 random liq-
uidity shock profile and date-2 reinvestment output function, the unconnected
entrepreneur would under-invest.
Proof of Proposition 1:
A Sketch: To show this result, ∂µ
∂I
> 0. That is, as a result of the differ-
ence between the two setup costs (Iu − Ic > 0), the liquidity constraint is
more likely to bind. If the liquidity condition is binding already, the level
of reinvestment (i.e., y(xL)) is lower for the unconnected than the connected
entrepreneur when the realization of date-1 turns out to below.
Facing the same reinvestment opportunities in date-1 for both the polit-
ically connected and unconnected entrepreneurs, the theorem tells us that
THEORETICAL APPENDIX 130
any increase in risk of expropriation (through an increase in I) would result
in a higher likelihood of hitting the liquidity need in state of xL, increases
in the value of shadow price µ, and lesser efficient outcome in the second-
best contract for the entrepreneur. One interpretation of this theorem in the
context is that in the absence of liquidity friction the friction resulting from
(perceived) risks of asset expropriation would cause further inefficiencies in
the second-best scenarios for the politically unconnected. The rationalizes
the importance of property rights (Johnson et al., 2002; Besley and Ghatak,
2010) to caution against risks of asset expropriation.




1−p ≤ −1 since q ≥ 1. From the bal-
anced budget condition, equation (B.2), plugging in optimal values from
the second-best contract, {y(xH), y(xL), L∗}, using implicit function theo-














, this completes the proof.
Proposition 2 (Political Economy Friction over Credit Allocation in a
Closed Regime). Assuming that all the agents in this economy try to solve
its contractual game, and the state-owned banks follow an allocative policy
in favor of the connected entrepreneurs, there exist three possible outcomes.
Then the following holds:
(a) When liquidity is abundantly available (L ≥ L̄ ⇐⇒ q=1), every en-
trepreneur from each group can get financing, and the first-best outcome is
available for everyone.
(b) When liquidity is insufficient (L ≤ L ⇐⇒ q ≫ 1) available only to the
best (bN) entrepreneur from the politically connected group, political economy
friction has no role to play.
(c) When liquidity supply lies in between L̄ and L (L < L < L̄ ⇐⇒ q > 1),
there is at least one agent j from the connected group bCj and one agent i from
the unconnected group i such that bCj < b
U
i . That is, an entrepreneur from
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the politically connected group is given preferential liquidity at the expense of
another entrepreneur with higher project returns.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider two extreme cases. One of these case concerns the insufficient liq-
uidity (L) in state-owned banks where only the most productive entrepreneur
bN from the politically connected type can receive. In this case, there is no
inefficiency. The suboptimal results from financial underdevelopment and
limited liquidity in the sense that even the bN−1 entrepreneur from the con-
nected group is rejected from reinvestment in date-1. In this case, q > 1 and
liquidity constraint does create a premium in itself as a result of underdevel-
opment.
The other extreme case concerns with sufficient liquidity (L̄), so that
everyone regardless of bi can get financing through their constrained opti-
mization program. In this case, q = 1 such that liquidity is so abundant that
competition for date-1 liquidity is unnecessary.
Only in cases where L < L < L̄, some liquidity is provided to the po-
litically connected second-best entrepreneur (bN−1) at the expense of likely
higher social return from the best player (bN) of the politically unconnected
group. Political and economic frictions, through the banking policy of state-
owned institutions, generates an inefficiency and creates a premium for the
politically connected entrepreneur when the socially valuable liquidity re-
source could have been given to the most productive agent from the politi-
cally unconnected group. This wedge between private allocation and socially
plausible allocation is driven solely by differentiated access to finance (Song
et al., 2011)3.
An open economy provides the politically unconnected grassroots en-
trepreneurs a possibility of soliciting financing from foreign VCs has changed
the game in theory and practice. This paper characterizes the behavior of
3One possible extension is to introduce the availability of rent-seeking technologies via
a bidding function in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1992) such that even within
the set of politically connected entrepreneurs {b1, b2, . . . , bN}, there is a threshold level of b̄
such that only those entrepreneurs with productivity b > b̄ would be willing to participate
in the investment game for getting a favorable liquidity treatment.
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outside VC in the following way: With a sharing θ of the private date-2
benefit, the VC is willing to provide liquidity in the low state xL(≡ 0) up to
the optimal first-best investment level b− 1 to remove liquidity concerns.
In this model, an open economy affords the politically unconnected grass-
roots entrepreneurs a possibility of soliciting financing from foreign VCs,
which in theory as well as in practice has changed the calculation of the
game. This model characterizes the behavior of outside VC in the following
way: With a sharing θ of the private date-2 benefit, the VC is willing to pro-
vide liquidity in the low state xL(≡ 0) up to the optimal first-best investment
level to remove liquidity concerns.
Proposition 3 (Possibility of Foreign VCs in an Open Economy Regime).
Assume that all the agents in this economy try to solve the contractual game
with the state-owned banks, which behave according to an allocative policy in
favor of the connected agents. In the equilibrium, there are politically un-
connected grassroots entrepreneur soliciting foreign VCs, where the threshold
conditions are being pinned down by the marginal entrepreneur.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider the behavior of the politically unconnected entrepreneurs in situ-
ation (iii) of Proposition 2. Let’s focus on the politically unconnected en-
trepreneurs with zero liquidity provision from state-owned banks in date-1.
So that y(xL) = 0 and y(xH) = b− 1 = yFB, the first-best level of reinvest-
ment when liquidity constraint is not binding given available capital from
outside VCs. Consider the marginal entrepreneur that is allowed to con-
tinue, then zero profit condition at date-0 has to be satisfied for a given set
of {p, b, I} satisfying:
p[xH − (b− 1)$ %& '
yFB
] = I. (B.8)
This defines a “marginal” entrepreneur. Such a conditions would balance
the bank’s date-0 profit and the “price” of state-owned bank’s liquidity is
irrelevant. The expected return from the high liquidity state and subsequent
first-best reinvestment has to cover at least the setup cost. κ is defined to
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as the rate of return of utilizing offshore investment and that of suffering
limited liquidity for that “marginal entrepreneur”:
κ =











The numerator, (1− θ)(byFB − (y
FB)2
2
), represents the return to entrepreneur
when liquidity shocks are smoothed given the fact that a portion θ of the




represent the return to private entrepreneur after deducting the success prob-
ability. For the profit-zero entrepreneur given I, κ > 1 ⇐⇒ 1 − θ > p, a
condition to raise foreign VCs.
Any departure from that “marginal entrepreneur” would complicate the
calculations. For example, a larger b means that the first-best level of rein-
vestment might not be possible under the zero-profit date-0 constraints. It is
possible to raise capital outside the state-owned banking system. On the
other hand, when I becomes large enough such that I > pxH , the en-
trepreneur is simply refused to start the project at all. This could be socially
inefficiency when date-2 productivity is high for some of the entrepreneurs
operating in some industries. In the formal characterization, the only func-
tion of an outside VC is to balance liquidity needs across states. If an ad-
ditional benefit is provided through the channel that reduces setup costs by
decreasing the risks of asset expropriation, then the attractiveness of using
this mechanism would be greatly enhanced. However, this “ attractiveness”
would have to be weighed against a searching cost where the entrepreneur
might not be able to be as lucky as Jack Ma to get support they need outside
China’s state-controlled banking systems.
In fact, the model in this section is quite clear in characterizing the be-
haviors of foreign VCs. Further work would have to consider other aspects
of the contract (Jovanovic and Szentes, 2013).
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B.3 Graphical Appendix
Figure B.3.1: Linear Probability Analysis of Main Outcomes: Different
Measures of Foreign Exposures
Note: These are coefficients on the measures of foreigin exposures through linear probability
models, which control for sex, education, a constant, and year and headquarter fixed effects.
Dataset: Forbes.
Figure B.3.2: Logistic Analysis of Main Outcomes: Different Measures of
Political Unconnectedness
Note: These are coefficients on the measures of foreigin exposures through logistic regres-
sions, which control for sex, education, and a constant. Dataset: Forbes.
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Figure B.3.3: Predicted Measures from Triangulation: Social Origins, For-
eign Exposures, and Financial Decisions
Panel A: Public Listing outside Mainland
Panel B: Using Offshore Vehicles
Note: Foreign exposure and political unconnectedness are two aggregate measures. The
predicted measures result from logit regressions similar in style with panel B, Table 2.3.
The controls are constant term, female, and college degree.
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Figure B.3.4: Contour Lines: Social Origins, Foreign Exposures, Sectoral
Entry and SOE Restructuring
Panel A: Entry into TMT Sectors
Panel B: SOE Restructuring Records
Note: Contour Lines for entry into TMT sectors and historical records of SOE. Darker
blue lines represents higher probability.
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B.4 Table Appendix
Table B.4.1: Selected Examples of Internet Billionaire Entrepreneurs from
Mainland China
Billionaire Names, Company Names, and Short Descriptions from Forbes
Jack Ma, Alibaba and Ant Fi-
nancial
“A former English teacher, Ma co-founded and chairs Alibaba
Group, one of the world’s largest e-commerce businesses.”
“Alibaba’s revenue in the 12 months ending in March 2017
rose by 56% to $23 billion.” “Alibaba’s IPO in New York in
2014 set a record as the world’s biggest public stock offering,
raising $25 billion.”
Pony Ma Huateng, Tencent “Ma Huateng (also known as Pony Ma) chairs Chinese Inter-
net giant Tencent Holdings, which ranks among the nation’s
largest businesses by market cap.” “Tencent’s popular social
messaging app WeChat has nearly one billion users.”
Robin Li, Baidu “Li is CEO of Baidu, China’s top search engine and one of the
world’s most popular websites.” “Baidu is known in China
as part of BAT – Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent – the trio of
companies that rank as the country’s three largest.”
William Ding, Netease “William Ding is the CEO of Netease, one of the world’s
largest online and mobile games businesses.” “Ding was
China’s richest man and its first Internet and gaming billion-
aire back in 2003.”
Richard Liu, JD “Liu Qiangdong, who also goes by the name Richard Liu, is
the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Chinese e-
commerce firm JD.com.” “The Nasdaq-listed company, which
has racked up losses amid fierce competition, is looking to
online financial services for new growth.”
Source: Author’s codebook. Short descriptions came from Forbes, the World’s Billionaire database.
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Table B.4.2: The Impact of Foreign Exposure on Offshore Financing and
Outside Listing
Sample Forbes Only Hurunb CEOb Partyb Hurunb
Cutoffa δf 1 2 3 Raw
Score
2 2 2 Foreign
VC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Logistic Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Offshore=1
Foreign Index 4.19 3.54 0.00d 2.13 2.59 1.96 5.64 3.49
(0.81) (0.71) (0.00) (0.43) (0.65) (0.48) (2.41) (0.97)
[0.73] [0.57] [0.00] [0.37] [0.63] [0.45] [2.42] [0.98]
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 146 146 134 146 224 199 97 224
Count R2 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.79
Adj Count R2 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.41
Panel B. Linear Probability Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Foreign Listing=1
Foreign Index 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.28 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.69
(0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.03) (0.13) (0.15) (0.25) (0.09)
[0.11] [0.15] [0.19] [0.04] [0.13] [0.14] [0.23] [0.11]
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 301 375 347 240 375
Adj. R2 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.43 0.31
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of impact of foreign exposures on the probability of using
offshore vehicles and listing outside mainland China using variants of equation (2.1). Column 1-3 generates
dummies given the cutoff values of the threshold. Column 4 controls the foreign index score. Fixing the
threshold cutoff at 2, column 5-7 use the augmented Hurun data, CEO subsample, and Party organ
subsample respectively. Column 8 considers only foreign VC financed event as a measure of exposure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters (city level). Linear
regressions are weighted by billionaire net worth. For linear models, the Huber-White robust standard
errors are reported in brackets. For logit models, a method suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is reported
in the bracket using both current and first headquarters as multiway clusters.
a The numbers (percentage) of billionaires selected given threshold values (1-3) are 41(13.6%), 24
(8.0%), and 5 (1.7%) for Forbes sample respectively.
b The expanded dataset augmented by Hurun top 300 is used.
c Controls are binaries for female and college degree.
d Dropped from estimation.
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Table B.4.3: Political Unconnectedness and Financing Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Offshore Foreign Listing
Panel A. Logistic Model; Sample: Forbes Only
Family background -0.03 -0.63 -0.66 -1.03
(0.60) (0.29) (0.35) (0.76)
[0.72] [0.37] [0.42] [0.82]
Job ties -0.29 0.11 -0.25
(0.68) (0.57) (0.63)
[0.66] [0.52] [0.63]
First gold 0.29 0.86
(0.70) (1.02)
[0.75] [1.11]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 146 146 146 156 156 156
Count R2 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77
Adj Count R2 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.36
Panel B. Logistic Model; Sample: Expanded by Hurun Top 300
Family background -0.42 -0.34 -0.46 -0.93
(0.62) (0.45) (0.53) (0.96)
[0.63] [0.45] [0.52] (0.95)
Job ties 0.15 -0.05 0.45 0.07
(0.64) (0.71) (0.48) (0.61)
[0.63] [0.69] [0.49] [0.63]
First gold 0.43 0.88
(0.60) (1.06)
[0.67] [1.09]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 224 224 224 215 215 215
Count R2 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75
Adj Count R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the city level for current headquarters.
All regressions include the constant term. Controls are binaries for female and college degree. For logit
models, a method suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is reported in the bracket using both current and
first headquarters as multiway clusters.
TABLE APPENDIX 140
Table B.4.4: Examining the Party Subsample
Sample Hurun Data
Cutoff δf 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cutoff δu 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Logistic Model; Y Firme,t,c : Foreign Listing=1 Panel B. Logistic Model; Y
Firm
e,t,c : Offshore=1
foreign measure 6.26 6.69 2.49 5.62 5.67 2.47
(2.64) (2.63) (0.63) (2.45) (2.27) (0.63)
[2.66] [2.68 [0.61] [2.44] [2.25] [0.61]
political measure 1.14 0.63 0.34 1.14 0.08 -0.59 0.50 0.08
(1.85) (1.07) (0.49) (1.85) (1.32) (1.11) (0.55) (1.32)
[1.89] [1.11] [0.49] [1.89] [1.42] [1.20] [0.55] [1.42]
Interaction 0.00b 0.00b 0.00b 6.26 0.00b 0.00b 0.00b 5.62
(.) (.) (.) (2.64) (.) (.) (.) (2.45)
[.] [.] [.] [2.66] (.) (.) (.) [2.44]
Controlsa Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-city fixed ef-
fects
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106 106 240 106 97 97 240 97
Count R2 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.78
Adj Count R2 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.36 0.30 0.18 0.36
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of impact of foreign exposures on the probability of using
offshore vehicles and listing outside mainland China using variants of equation (2.1) on the subsample of
firms with presence of a party organ.For logit models, a method suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is
reported in the bracket using both current and first headquarters as multiway clusters.
a Controls are binaries for female and college degree.
b Dropped from estimation.
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Table B.4.5: The Interacted Effect of Foreign Elements and Social Origin
on Financing Decisions
Sample Forbes (n:301) Hurun’s Expanded Sample (n:375)
All All CEO Party All
δf English Education Management Sum Index 2 2 2 Foreign VC
δU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Linear Probability Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Offshore=1
Family
0.00a 0.00a 0.52 0.09 0.23 0.15 -0.11 0.18
(.) (.) (0.67) (0.34) (0.52) (0.60) (0.47) (0.29)
[.] [.] [0.60] [0.30] [0.47] [0.49] [0.49] [0.39]
Job Tie
0.54 0.75 0.37 0.33 0.86 0.77 1.26 0.61
(0.32) (0.33) (0.65) (0.19) (0.28) (0.27) (0.48) (0.31)
[0.32] [0.40] [0.52] [0.15] [0.25] [0.27] [0.38] [0.32]
First Gold
0.00a 0.00a 0.27 0.06 0.66 0.57 0.00a 0.56
(.) (.) (0.70) (0.47) (0.21) (0.24) (.) (0.32)
[.] [.] [0.54] [0.36] [0.25] [0.28] [.] [0.33]
Sum Index
0.51 0.73 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.25 0.73 0.18
(0.30) (0.30) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.56) (0.09)
[0.31] [0.39] [0.19] [0.08] [0.12] [0.13] [0.46] [0.13]
Panel B. Logistic Model; Dependent variable is Y Firme,t,c : Foreign Listing=1
Family
0.00a 0.00a 85.63 1.93 3.03 2.70 0.00a 4.96
(.) (.) (8.18) (1.71) (2.75) (3.30) (.) (2.19)
[.] [.] [.]a [1.82] [2.89] [3.49] [.] [2.39]
Job Tie
15.39 16.59 36.17 3.34 3.88 2.81 93.62 5.03
(1.89) (1.53) (6.51) (2.32) (1.55) (1.51) (.)a (2.16)
[1.23] [0.57] [.]a [2.42] [1.55] [ 1.51] [.]a [2.13]
First Gold
0.00a 0.00a 36.2 1.04 16.99 15.87 0.00a 4.62
(.) (.) (6.33) (2.59) (1.96) (2.52) (.) (2.03)
[.] [.] [.]a [2.73] [1.17] [2.70] [.] [2.03]
Sum Index
15.28 16.58 103.64 1.09 2.09 1.57 82.59 2.46
(1.85) (1.51) (.)a (0.84) (1.16) (1.01) (4.38) (1.31)
[1.18] [0.48] [.]a [0.88] [1.17] (1.04) [.]a [1.33]
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of the interacted impact of foreign exposures and political
unconnectedness on the probability of using offshore vehicles and listing outside mainland China using
variants of equation (2.1). Each cell presents the estimated interacted effect from one regression. All
specifications contain controls and FE. Column 1-3 uses different values of the cutoff to generate the
binary measure of foreign element. Column 4 represents the effect of the foreign index score. Fixing
the threshold cutoff at 2, column 5-7 use the augmented Hurun data, CEO subsample, and Party organ
subsample respectively. Column (8) considers only foreign VC financed event as a measure of exposure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of current headquarters (city level).
For panel A, the Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in brackets. For panel B, a method
suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) is reported in the bracket using both current and first headquarters
as multiway clusters.
a Dropped by estimation
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Table B.4.6: Means and Deviations of Major Variables for Global Billion-
aires in a Communist State: the World’s Billionaires, Forbes, 2017
I. Types of Entrepreneurs II. Pooled Sample
III Type I II All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A measure of political connection: 0.004 0.333 0.043 0.060
family background dummy (0.066) (0.476) (0.208) (0.238)
A measure of political connection: 0.183 0.896 0 0.282
job connection dummy (0.387) (0.309) (0) (0.451)
A measure of political connection: 0.030 0.938 0 0.173
first scoop of gold dummy (0.172) (0.245) (0) (0.379)
An aggregate measure: 0.213 2.188 0.043 0.515
political connection, range: [0, 3] (0.410) (0.394) (0.209) (0.831)
A measure of foreign element: 0.030 0 0.348 0.050
English speaking dummy (0.172) (0) (0.487) (0.218)
A measure of foreign element: 0.023 0 0.130 0.023
foreign education dummy (0.131) (0) (0.344) (0.151)
A measure of foreign element: 0.004 0.041 0.957 0.083
foreign financing dummy (0.066) (0.202) (0.209) (0.276)
A measure of foreign element: 0.022 0.062 0.783 0.086
foreign management dummy (0.146) (0.244) (0.422) (0.281)
An aggregate measure: 0.074 0.104 2.217 0.242
foreign element, range: [0, 4] (0.308) (0.371) (0.850) (0.686)
A measure of education: 0.500 0.500 0.870 0.528
college education dummy (0.501) (0.505) (0.344) (0.500)
A measure of education: 0.261 0.208 0.522 0.272
elite college dummy (0.440) (0.410) (0.511) (0.446)
A measure of financing decisions: 0.817 0.708 0.739 0.794
listing dummy (0.387) (0.459) (0.449) (0.405)
A measure of financing decisions: 0.213 0.229 0.696 0.252
foreign listing dummy (0.410) (0.425) (0.470) (0.435)
A measure of financing decisions: 0.104 0.500 0 0.159
SOE restructuring dummy (0.306) (0.505) (0) (0.366)
A measure of financing decisions: 0.209 0.188 0.870 0.255
offshore vehicle dummy (0.407) (0.394) (0.344) (0.437)
A measure of innovation industry: 0.335 0.271 0.826 0.362
TMT sector dummy (0.473) (0.449) (0.388) (0.481)
N: 230 48 23 301
Notes: Statistics in column 1 to 3 are based on the type of the billionaire entrepreneur, consistent with
our conceptual framework outlined in the paper. For the total number of 319 global billionaires on the the
World’s Billionaire List, Forbes, 2017 from mainland China, the missing rate is around 5 percent (18/319)
for the fact that we cannot identify the type of the entrepreneur as a result of the lack of sufficient
information from public sources.
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Table B.4.7: Variable Descriptions
Measures of Political (un)Connectedness/Social Origins
Family background A dummy variable which equals to one if the billionaire entrepreneur comes
from a family unconnected with communist party elites, and zero otherwise.
Job (un)connectedness A dummy variable which equal to one if the billionaire entrepreneur’s prior
occupation has limited linkages with the party-state (e.g., senior managers at
a state-owned enterprise), zero otherwise.
The first scoop of gold A dummy variable which equal to one if the billionaire entrepreneur’s first
scoop of gold has limited linkages with the party-state (e.g., senior managers
at a state-owned enterprise), zero otherwise.
Political unconnected-
ness index
An aggregate measure by summation of three measures above.
Measures of Foreign Exposures
English speaking A dummy variable which equal to one if the billionaire entrepreneur is capable
of speaking fluent English, zero otherwise.
Foreign education A dummy variable which equal to one if the billionaire entrepreneur has col-
lege degrees from universities outside mainland China, zero otherwise.
Foreign financing A dummy variable which equal to one if the company has been backed up by
venture capitalists outside mainland China before its IPO, zero otherwise.
Foreign management A dummy variable which equal to one if the company (as of 2017) has non-
Chinese names on the senior management or the board of directors, zero
otherwise. Source: Orbis.
Foreign exposure index An aggregate measure by summation of four measures above.
Main Outcome Variables
Public Listing A dummy variable which equal to one if one of the companies controlled by
the billionaire entrepreneur is a public company, zero otherwise.
Foreign listing A dummy variable which equal to one if one of the listed company controlled
by the billionaire entrepreneur is floated outside mainland China (e.g., New
York Stock Exchange), zero otherwise.
SOE restructuring A dummy variable which equal to one if the company has a record of state-
owned enterprise restructuring before its IPO, zero otherwise.
Offshore vehicle A dummy variable which equal to one if the company (as of 2017) uses an
offshore vehicle, zero otherwise. Source: Orbis.
TMT sector entry A dummy variable which equal to one if party organ is found within the
company, zero otherwise.
Control and Other Variables
College education A dummy variable which equal to one if the entrepreneur has a college degree,
zero otherwise.
Elite college A dummy variable which equal to one if the entrepreneur has an elite college
degree, zero otherwise. (Rule: Key universities using 211 or 985 projects.)
Party A dummy variable which equal to one if a party organ is identified within the
company, zero otherwise.
CEO A dummy variable which equal to one if the entrepreneur is the founding
CEO, zero otherwise.
Female A dummy variable which equal to one if the entrepreneur is a female, zero
otherwise.
Founding year This comes from the company’s website for each of the billionaire.
Founding headquarter The unit: city level. The company’s website.
Current headquarter The unit: city level. The company’s website.
Source: Author’s codebook and database unless stated otherwise. Most of the data collection work is
done by gathering public information and building a detailed profile.
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B.5 Case Studies: Three Short Personal Bi-
ographies
In this section, I will provide a case study via the proposed conceptual
framework to sketch three personal biographies of billionaire entrepreneurs
in the history of wealth creation from mainland China.
Connected with Bank Loans (type I): Wang Jianlin, Company
Name: Wanda. Net worth: 31.3 Billion USD (Feb. 2017 version, Forbes).
Global Rankings: 18.
Mr. Wang Jianlin, the founder of Dalian Wanda Group, is one of the most
prominent real estate developers in China. His early career was profiled
in a 2013 Bloomberg article, Property Mogul Emerges as China’s Richest
Person, which summarizes Mr. Wang’s early career before the establishment
of Wanda Group4:
Wang joined the People’s Liberation Army as a teenager and
served for 16 years before he was honorably discharged as an
officer. He later took a job at an indebted residential construction
company affiliated with the Northern port city of Dalian, changed
the company’s name to Dalian Wanda after turning around its
performance and became the general manager in 1992.
The company, Wanda group, was founded when he was a civil servant at Xi-
gang District, Dalian, where the later infamous and disgraced politician Bo
Xilai once served. From an early stage of his career, Mr. Wang Jianlin has
showcased his business talent and acumen by transforming dilapidated neigh-
borhoods into residential buildings through deals with local governments.
Apart from the official story of Wanda’s success, the Chinese media later
revealed the political history of Wang Jianlin and his wife. Their fathers
fought together during the Chinese revolutionary war and civil war as vet-
eran Long March soldiers. After retiring from the People’s Liberation Army
4 Bloomberg News (2013, Aug.19). Property Mogul Emerges as China’s Richest Per-
son.
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(PLA), Mr. Wang first joined the government and then worked as a man-
ager for a state-owned construction firm for four year. It was not until Deng
Xiaoping’s Southern Talks and his famous speech on market socialism that
he had the opportunity to reorganize the SOE into a joint-stock company.
Starting from a small and regional company, Wanda made its nationwide
expansions from 1997. Meanwhile, Mr. Wang and his insider, Sun Xishuang,
a billionaire business partner, who was also featured on the Forbes 2017 bil-
lionaire list, began a process of privatization program through which stocks
of employees were bought and transferred into his own hands. As China’s
business registration record showed, it took more than ten years until Mr.
Wang finalized his internal control of Wanda and settled the state-owned
equities and shares for employees.
While Mr. Wang’s business skills must be rated as first-class among
his peers, he benefited greatly from first-mover advantage on housing recon-
struction projects as a state-owned manager. Due to the waves of market
socialism and privatization, his net worth soared. However, without his po-
litical connection, information and the ability to restructure an SOE initially
and privatize it throughout more than ten years, he would never have the
opportunity of becoming a global billionaire in less than two decades from a
Maoist soldier in his youth. In his case, the part from rent-seeking and the
part from contributions from his genuine business skills are inseparably so-
lidified onto the growth path of Wanda Group, a multinational conglomerate
that started from scratch thirty years ago. One of his famous slogans - “stay
close to the government, yet stay away from politics”5 - precisely reveals the
type of his entrepreneurship and the philosophy behind Wanda’s business
model.
Unconnected with Foreign Financing (type II): Li Yanhong, also
known as Robin Li, Company Name: Baidu (Listed on NASDAQ, ticker:
BIDU). Net worth: 13.3 Billion USD (Feb. 2017 version, Forbes). Global
5There are many versions of the same phrase, [yuanli zhengzhi, qinjin zhengfu]. This
is also available from one of the English sources, South China Morning Post (2014, Dec.
20). Dalian Wanda’s Wang Jianlin avoids politics, stays close to government.
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Rankings: 87.
Robin Li, as the name itself would speak, has deep linkages with the
western world. He was smart in his early years even though his parents were
only factory workers in a chemical plant in Shanxi province, inland of China.
Mr. Li aced the college exam and was admitted to Peking University, a
leading institution in Beijing, where he graduated with B.S in information
management. Early on, he was seen as a reticent person with an early passion
for computer science and technology. To further his education, Robin went
to pursue his Ph.D. degree in computer science at the University at Buffalo,
The State University of New York, where he resigned and joined the private
sector after a Master’s degree. As an early expert in search engine, Robin
developed algorithms for site-sorting and was awarded a U.S patent while
working at IDD Information Services6, which was later applied to his site
sorting company, Baidu, the largest Chinese search engine was operating in
Mainland China, as of 2017.
Obtaining initial financing to implement his technology in Mainland China
has become the most critical part of Robin’s story and the driving mecha-
nism of the conceptual framework. In his published book (Tsinghua Uni-
versity Press, 1999), Robin introduced the innovation game popular among
entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley to his native audience, Business Warfare
in Silicon Valley7, Robin painted an eye-dazzling picture to his audience of
the business tactics used in Silicon Valleys, writing that VCs were the finan-
cial backers of technology driven start-ups. At the end of 1999, Robin and
his partner, were able to receive 1.2 million USD seed money from two VCs
firms, Integrity Partners and Peninsula Capital, on their own advice. Just
as an article from New York Times reported after Robin Li became one of
the youngest billionaires from mainland China,
The partners raised $1.2 million from two Silicon Valley venture
capital firms, Integrity Partners, and Peninsula Capital, and with
6Robin Li’s patent information: “Hypertext document retrieval system and method”,
USA Publication number: US5920859 A. Also Robin’s publication: Yanhong Li, ”Toward
a Qualitative Search Engine,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 24-29,
July/August 1998.
7Guigu Shangzhan
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their seed money in hand flew to China and founded Baidu in a
hotel room overlooking Beijing University’s campus. Nine months
later, in September 2000, two other venture capital firms, Draper
Fisher Jurvetson and IDG Technology Venture, pumped another
$10 million into the startup8.
With two rounds of capital injection from the west, the rest was then history.
The company Baidu was listed on NASDAQ after five years of its original
inception, making Robin Li one of the youngest self-made billionaires and
household names in China. Robin Li and Jack Ma have become classic
examples of politically unconnected Chinese entrepreneurs leveraging their
business intuitions and entrepreneurs skills on the shoulders of foreign VCs.
Considering the proposed conceptual framework, the politically unconnected
entrepreneurs with foreign capital are the driving force of innovations with
the flavor of real American entrepreneurs, Silicon Valley-style.
Unconnected with Internal Financing (type III): Liu Yonghao,
Company Name: New Hope. Net worth: 4.6 Billion USD (Feb. 2017 version,
Forbes). Global Rankings: 359.
Unlike Mr. Wang Jianlin, Mr. Liu Yonghao’s personal story from poverty
to wealth cannot be more different. Mr. Liu, the founder of New Hope, is a
self-made billionaire businessman in China. Along with his three brothers,
the Liu’s family is one of the richest business families among which one of
Liu’s brothers, Mr. Liu Yongyan (6.6 Billion USD, Global Rankings: 215),
was also in the billionaire list of Feb. 2017, Forbes. Although the business
of New Hope, the company, has expanded into multiple sectors, its creation
does not enjoy the luxury of an SOE restructuring. Tracing Mr. Liu’s initial
occupation as a teacher at a technical school in Sichuan province, a Financial
Times article titled Liu Yonghao: from chicken farmers to billionaire, wrote9:
In 1982, he and his three brothers quit their government jobs
and sold their bicycles and watches to raise $120 in start-up cap-
ital. They invested in breeding quails and chickens to sell to
8New York Times (2006, Sept.17). The Rise of Baidu (That’s Chinese for Google).
9Financial Times (2011, June 6). Liu Yonghao: from chicken farmer to billionaire.
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other farmers near their home in rural Sichuan province and soon
branched out into the animal-feed business.
By 1992, Mr. Liu and his brothers’ agribusiness company had become one
of the largest animal-feed groups in the country. With enormous wealth, the
brothers were disagreeing over firm policies and equity shares. That is why,
between 1995-1996, the brothers had no choice but to delineate the property
rights of the company among themselves after which each of the four brothers
settled into their own ventures. That was the beginning of development of
New Hope Group to what the company is today. Mr. Liu was profiled
in Forbes as early as 1995 when he was named to be the richest man in
China with 600 Million RMB. Despite his much-diversified investments today
(including a stake in China Minsheng Bank, the first privately-owned bank in
China under CPC leadership), this man was the epitome of a self-made global
billionaire as low as a chicken farmer. As of 2018, the company remained
private under Liu’s management. In terms of the conceptual framework,
Mr. Liu represents the indigenous entrepreneurs bootstrapping themselves
upon retained earnings, which helped finance their investments along the
accumulation path.
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Appendix C
Serving the People or the People’s Note
C.1 Graphical and Table Appendix
Figure C.1.1: Southern Talks: An Event Flow
Compiled by the author
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C.2 Additional Information
This section provides additional information on things: (a) the origin of
Chen Yun’s cage theory view of market socialism and (b) how CPC counter-
acted the rise of private sector with a “grabbing big and letting go of small”
strategy.
(a) The origin of Chen Yun’s cage theory of market socialism
Historians have attributed Chen Yun’s original idea of a cage theory to his
role in formulating the economic policies of 1961-1962 when he was quickly
sidelined by Mao and his supporters in preference to a more radical approach
to socialization. Gradually, this idea went further into the reformist era, as
one New York Times article reported after Chen Yun’s death1
He was perhaps best known for his vision of a “bird-cage econ-
omy.” He argued that the market in China should operate like a
bird in a cage. The cage must not be too small, lest the bird suf-
focate, but there had to be a cage to contain the bird, otherwise
it would fly away.
(b) How CPC counteracted the rise of private with a “grabbing big and
letting go of small” strategy.
In the main text, the formal treatment of the proposed framework relates
to Shirk (1993), a critique that hinges on the compatibility of CPC’s political
survival with marketization and privatization of the economy. While Deng’s
ST has spurred a massive wave of privatization and further marketization of
the economy, the state-sector responded with a number of strategic policy
packages, known as “grabbing big and letting go of small”, to which Hsieh
and Song (2015) provides an analysis.
1The New York Times (1995, April.11). Chen Yun, a Chi-
nese Communist Patriarch Who Helped Slow Reforms, Is Dead at




Figure C.1.2: A Falsification Test
This figure constructs a density plot around the cutoff (i.e, ST), based on Cattaneo et al.















































































































































































































































































































ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE: THE 1992 COHORT 154
C.3 Anecdotal Evidence: The 1992 Cohort
Using the watershed year of 1992 as a cutoff threshold in this paper
has not been chosen for random. There are at least two practical reasons
underlying this. First, the visit Deng made to the south induced many young
officials in the bureaucratic promotion game to join the wave of founding
their own business. This greatly altered the educational level and social
composition of money-making entrepreneurs.
In an article from Bloomberg2, the author clearly understood the key
message of this paper:
In the early 90s, a number of government officials inspired by
Deng’s “Southern Visit” left their government roles and ventured
into businesses. This was a rather speculative move that required
great courage. If they failed, the “iron rice bowl” they had aban-
doned would not welcome them back with open arms. At this
time, these people were considered foolish by many for leaving
these highly desired positions of stability and prosperity. The ma-
jority of this cohort were quite successful in their entrepreneurial
pursuits and some of them eventually became industry leaders.
The phrase, the 1992 cohort, was coined by Mr. CHEN Dongsheng, a
billionaire entrepreneur, who later married the granddaughter of Mao. Before
plunging into business, Mr. Chen worked as deputy editor of Management
World, a publication of the Development Research Center of China’s State
Council. This phrase captures a cohort of entrepreneurs leaving the state
sector and becoming global billionaires by founding their businesses, inspired
by Deng’s Southern Talks. A book titled, The 1992 Cohort (see below the
picture), was published to characterize this cohort of business entrepreneurs.
The dedication of this book was given to the twentieth anniversary of Deng
Xiaoping’s Southern Talks.
2 Bloomberg News (2016, April.5). The Rise of Entrepreneurship in
China. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/tseedward/2016/04/05/
the-rise-of-entrepreneurship-in-china/.
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Figure C.3.1: A Book on the 1992 Cohort of Entrepreneurs
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